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“ENDANGERMENT” OF THE COMMON LAW:
DO RULEMAKINGS AS TO GREENHOUSE GASES
UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT DISPLACE FEDERAL
COMMON-LAW CLAIMS FOR THE PUBLIC NUISANCE
OF GLOBAL WARMING?
∗

Kyle G. Grimm

I.

INTRODUCTION

As technology has continued to develop over the past century,
1
global air pollution has also increased. Yet it was not until the later
part of the twentieth century that legislation was adopted to address
2
this issue. With the recent increase in global air pollution, environmental activists started to press for action to protect our natural re3
sources and to minimize the negative effects caused by this pollution.
Lately, particular attention has been placed on global climate
change. One method of addressing this issue has been through the
initiation of public-nuisance lawsuits seeking redress for the effects of
4
global warming. Now that the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) has taken regulatory action to address the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) into the atmosphere, the question of whether
these administrative rulemakings displace public-nuisance-as-globalwarming causes of action must be addressed.
∗
J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., Union
College. Thanks to Professor Marc Poirier, Professor Catherine McCauliff, and all of
my editors on the Seton Hall Law Review for their insightful comments throughout the
writing process.
1
See generally The History of Air Quality, ENVTL. INS. OF HOUSTON,
http://prtl.uhcl.edu/portal/page/portal/EIH/outreach/tfors/history (last visited
Dec. 30, 2010) (noting major events throughout the history of air pollution, as well
as governmental and private responses to the growing concern over the consequences of air pollution).
2
See id.
3
See id.
4
See, e.g., Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863
(N.D. Cal. 2009); California v. GMC, No. 06-05755, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2007); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d
265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev’d, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813
(Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174).
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In the past few decades the effects of GHGs in the atmosphere—
5
most importantly carbon dioxide (CO2) —have taken center stage in
the air-pollution debate as global climate change is becoming more
6
and more apparent. A general consensus now exists in the scientific
community that the release of carbon dioxide and other GHGs into
the atmosphere, due in part to human activity, contributes to global
7
warming. Global warming leads to changes in weather patterns, rising sea levels, a decrease in snow cover, and poses a risk of extreme
8
weather, among other effects. Arctic ice, for example, has decreased
9
in thickness by forty percent since the 1960s. In turn, this has led
some to predict that global sea levels will rise between ten to twenty10
three inches by 2100. Similarly, as ocean temperature has risen over
the last thirty-five years, the number of category four and five hurri11
canes has increased. Furthermore, the wildland fire season saw a
record-breaking year in 2006 for both the number of acres burned

5
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886, 18,895 (proposed Apr.
24, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1) (“[C]arbon dioxide is the most important greenhouse gas directly emitted by human activities in terms of its total additional heating effects being exerted on the climate.”); Herve Le Treut et al., Historical
Overview of Climate Change Science, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE
BASIS
93,
97 (2007), available
at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-chapter1.pdf.
6
See Le Treut et al., supra note 5, at 100.
7
See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. at 18,888 (“The heating effect caused by human-induced buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is very
likely the cause of most of the observed global warming over the last 50 years.” (emphasis added)). The term “very likely” is a word of art used by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—the body charged with researching global climate
change by the United Nations—which means that there is a 90 to 99 percent probability of its occurrence. See id. at 18,888 n.2. IPCC shared the Nobel Peace Prize with
Al Gore in 2007 “for [its] efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge
about man-made climate change, and to lay the foundations for the measures that
are needed to counteract such change.” Press Release, Norwegian Nobel Committee, The Nobel Peace Prize for 2007 (Oct. 12, 2007), available at
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007/press.html.
8
Morgan McCue Sport, Comment, An Inconvenient Suit: California v. General
Motors Corporation and a Look at Whether Global Warming Constitutes an Actionable Public Nuisance or a Nonjusticiable Political Question, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 583, 591–93 (2007).
9
The Consequences of Global Warming on Glaciers and Sea Level, NATURAL RES. DEF.
COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/globalWarming/fcons/fcons4.asp (last visited Dec.
30, 2010).
10
Id.
11
The Consequences of Global Warming on Weather Patterns, NATURAL RES. DEF.
COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/globalWarming/fcons/fcons1.asp (last visited Dec.
30, 2010).
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12

and the number of fires reported. These changes indicate the urgent need for action to address global climate change and, consequently, the emission of GHGs into the atmosphere.
Starting in the early part of the past decade, several plaintiffs—
perhaps unhappy with a lack of legislative action to address global
climate change—initiated common law public nuisance actions
13
against producers of GHGs. These plaintiffs have pointed to the
contribution of GHGs to global climate change and to the negative
effects of this change to argue that there is sufficient harm to impart
standing. Plaintiffs have sought both damages and injunctions
against polluting activity in these cases. District courts, however, have
refused to decide these issues on the merits by holding that the causes and effects of global warming present a nonjusticiable political
14
question. These courts have held that at least one of several Baker
15
factors is “inextricably linked” to this question, and thus the ques16
tions that these cases pose are nonjusticiable.
District courts located in the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits
have used the political-question doctrine to dismiss global-warming12

Id.
See, e.g., Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863
(N.D. Cal. 2009); California v. GMC, No. 06-05755, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2007); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d
265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev’d, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813
(Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174).
14
See Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 883; GMC, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 68547, at *48; Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274.
15
“Baker factors” refers to the case Baker v. Carr, the landmark case in which the
Supreme Court laid down the current framework of the political-question doctrine.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Specifically, the Court stated that the justiciability of a claim depends on “whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and
its breach judicially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be
judicially molded.” Id. at 198. The Court then announced six different instances,
referred to as the “Baker factors,” in which a political question is presented and a
claim is therefore nonjusticiable. These tests include the following:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility
of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due to
coordinate branches of the government; or [5] an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6]
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.
Id. at 217.
16
See GMC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at *38–48 (holding that the first three
Baker factors are indicated in a global-warming-as-public-nuisance action).
13
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as-public-nuisance claims. The first such case to be dismissed on political-question grounds was Connecticut v. American Electric Power Com17
pany (AEP). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, recently vacated the district court’s ruling and held that global-warming-aspublic-nuisance claims do in fact present justiciable questions over
18
which district courts can exercise jurisdiction. Similar to the Second
Circuit, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Comer v. Murphy Oil
USA, also reversed a district court ruling that held global-warming-as19
public-nuisance claims present nonjusticiable political questions.
Thus, the two circuit courts to decide this issue have held in favor of
the plaintiffs and allowed these suits to move forward.
Notably, however, this is not a settled question. In December
2010, the Supreme Court of the United States granted a writ of certi20
orari to decide this question, among others presented in AEP.
Moreover, subsequent to the panel decision in Comer, the Fifth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc, which temporarily vacated the pan21
el decision. Several months later, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the
appeal for a lack of quorum because too many judges were forced to
22
recuse themselves from the case. This action had the effect of permanently vacating the panel decision and reinstating the district
23
court opinion. Therefore, neither the Second nor Fifth Circuit opi17

406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted,
131 S. Ct. 813 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174).
19
585 F.3d 855, 880 (5th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010),
appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010).
20
Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 813 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174).
21
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), appeal dismissed, 607
F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010).
22
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010).
23
Id. at 1055. The Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected the argument that because of
the procedural posture of the case, the circuit should be “dis-enbanced” and the
panel decision reinstated. Id. at 1054
This case was properly voted en banc. The panel opinion and the
judgment of the panel were lawfully vacated. Without a quorum to
conduct any judicial business, this en banc court has no authority to
rewrite the established rules of the Fifth Circuit for this one case and to
order this case, properly voted en banc, ‘dis-enbanced.’ Moreover, we
have no authority to interpret a plainly applicable rule as simply a
blank, on grounds that ‘it was not designed to apply’ to a situation
where its terms have undisputed application.
Id. Similarly, the court refused to hold the case in abeyance until a properly constituted quorum could be achieved. Id.
It is purely speculative as to when the current vacancy on this court will
be filled and it is, of course, unknown whether that judge may also be
recused. Furthermore, we have no way of knowing when another sitting
18
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nions addressing this issue are dispositive for purposes of each particular case and are not binding precedent, although they continue
to be persuasive authority. Furthermore, not all district courts have
agreed with the Second and Fifth Circuit decisions. The Northern
District of California recently held—subsequent to the Second Circuit’s decision in AEP—that the court was without subject matter jurisdiction in a case where a native tribe of Inupiat Eskimos sued twenty-four oil, energy, and utility companies for their contribution to
global warming because the case presented nonjusticiable political
24
questions. Although these circuit court rulings are not the last word
on the matter, these decisions send a clear message that courts
should no longer look for cover in this hotly debated area by relying
on the political-question doctrine. As Matt Pawa, lead attorney for
the plaintiffs in AEP, recently said, “Global Warming polluters everywhere: you are on notice that you are committing a tort and we will
25
sue you.”
Now that plaintiffs can potentially move forward with their global-warming-as-public-nuisance actions, another important issue arises:
are federal public-nuisance claims for global warming displaced by
federal statutory and regulatory law? The Second Circuit held in AEP
that at the time the case was decided no federal scheme “spoke directly” to the plaintiffs’ question in global-warming-as-public-nuisance
26
actions and that such claims therefore were not displaced. Thus,
further development of the federal statutory and regulatory law concerning the emission of GHGs needs to occur before federal-publicnuisance actions in this context are no longer viable, at least in the
Second Circuit.
The judiciary is not the only place in which opponents to GHG
emissions have sought to exert their agenda; debate about limiting
GHG emissions has also taken place in the legislative arena. Recentjudge in regular active service of the Court may become ‘undisqualified’ or indeed whether another judge of this en banc court may become disqualified to sit further.
Id. Three judges dissented in two vigorous opinions, which both argued that the majority deprived the litigants of their right to a direct appeal in violation of their statutory rights on the basis of a local rule. See id. at 1055–56 (Davis, J., dissenting); id. at
1056–66 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
24
Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 883 (N.D.
Cal. 2009).
25
Oregondem, Sue a Polluter—New Green Light from the Courts, DAILY KOS (Sept. 22,
2009,
3:55
AM),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2009/9/22/785080/-Sue-aPolluterNew-Green-Light-from-the-Courts.
26
Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 381. The Fifth Circuit in Comer did not address
this issue.
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27

ly, a cap-and-trade bill has been passed by the House of Representa28
tives. This bill, however, stalled in the Senate, and such a bill seems
unlikely to pass in either legislative chamber during the 112th Con29
gress.
A more promising development concerning GHG regulation has
come directly from the EPA. In April 2009, Lisa Jackson, the new
Administrator of the EPA, released a proposed endangerment and
cause or contribute finding for greenhouse gases pursuant to the
Clean Air Act (CAA or “the Act”) § 202(a) (the “proposed endan30
germent and cause or contribute finding”). Then, in December
2009, Administrator Jackson released a final ruling in accordance
with the proposed endangerment and cause or contribute finding
31
(the “final endangerment and cause or contribute finding”). As
part of the EPA’s administrative authority under the CAA, the Administrator may promulgate regulations for certain “criteria pollutants”
32
that are deemed a “danger to human health and welfare.” Pursuant
to this final endangerment and cause or contribute finding, the EPA
will regulate GHG emissions from new motor vehicles and new motor
33
vehicle engines under the CAA. Such regulations have already been
34
adopted for light-duty vehicles, and regulations have also been pro27

Editorial, The Cap and Tax Fiction, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2009, at A14 (“Under a
cap-and-trade system, government sets a cap on the total amount of carbon that can
be emitted nationally; companies then buy or sell permits to emit CO2. The cap gets
cranked down over time to reduce total carbon emissions.”).
28
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
(2009).
29
See, e.g., Kate Galbraith, Next Year Offers Little Cheer for Those Battling Climate
Change, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/27/
business/energy-environment/27green.html?_r=1&scp=4&sq=cap%20and%20
trade&st=cse.
30
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886 (proposed Apr. 24,
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).
31
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15,
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).
32
See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (2006); id. § 7521(a)(1).
33
See Proposed Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas
Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 Fed. Reg.
49,454 (proposed Sept. 28, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86, 600; 49 C.F.R.
pts. 531, 533, 537, 538).
34
See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536–38). “Light-duty
vehicles” refer to passenger cars and light trucks including, among others, minivans,
passenger vans, pickup trucks, and sport-utility vehicles. Emission Standards Reference
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posed for medium- and heavy-duty vehicles. Similarly, the EPA is also seeking to regulate the GHG emissions from large stationary
sources pursuant to the Prevention of Significant Deterioration
36
(PSD) program and Title V of the CAA. These sections of the CAA
set up a permitting program for stationary sources during the pre37
construction phase and operational phase, respectively.
Although the Second Circuit clearly held in AEP that no federal
statutory scheme displaced federal public-nuisance claims at the time
that case was decided, the court did indicate that future displace38
ment of federal global-warming-as-public-nuisance actions was poss39
ible through administrative rulemaking.
Therefore, we are presented with the question of whether regulation of GHGs under the
CAA would displace the federal common law of public nuisance for
claims seeking relief for the effects of global climate change and, if
so, what the scope of this displacement would look like.
Part II of this Comment will briefly outline the law of public
nuisance and the development of displacement jurisprudence. It will
also summarize key aspects of the CAA, including the ways in which
the Act treats stationary, mobile, and fuel sources. Part III will explain the final endangerment and cause or contribute finding, the
“light-duty vehicle” rule, and the “tailoring” rule. Part IV will ex-

Guide: Basic Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/otaq/
standards/basicinfo.htm#1 (last visited Dec. 30, 2010).
35
See Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines
and Vehicles, 75 Fed. Reg. 74,152 (proposed Nov. 30, 2010) (to be codified at C.F.R.
pts. 85, 86, 1036, 1037, 1065, 1066, 1068).
36
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70,
71). Although the EPA is not currently seeking to regulate stationary sources
through the adoption of an endangerment finding under § 108 of the CAA and subsequent administrative rulemakings, the EPA considers the regulation of GHGs under the “light-duty vehicle” rule as triggering the PSD and Title V permitting programs. See discussion infra note 173.
37
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470–7492, 7501–7515, 7661–7661f (2006).
38
Displacement is often confused with pre-emption, but pre-emption is a substantively different concept. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309,
371 n.37 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 317 n.9 (1981)), cert.
granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174); Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v.
Cnty. of Oneida, 719 F.2d 525, 530 (2d Cir. 1983), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 470 U.S. 226 (1985); see also discussion infra Part II.B.
39
See Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 392–93 (“‘It may happen that new federal
laws and new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law
of nuisance. But until that comes to pass, federal courts will be empowered to appraise the equities of the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance’ by greenhouse
gases.” (emphasis added) (quoting Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91,
106 (1971))).
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amine what the contours of federal displacement should look like
with these rulemakings officially adopted. Lastly, Part V will briefly
posit what the consequences of this possible displacement scheme
may be in regard to federal action in both the legislative and executive branches, as well as opine on what the best future course of action is moving forward.
II. THE LAW OF PUBLIC NUISANCE, DISPLACEMENT,
AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT
A. Public Nuisance
Although the tort of public nuisance was originally considered a
crime, a cause of action for public nuisance serves only as a basis for
40
civil liability in modern jurisprudence. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts defines a public nuisance as “an unreasonable interference with
41
a right common to the general public.” This definition, which a majority of states have adopted, has also been used in the context of fed42
eral common law. In fact, the court in AEP explicitly adopted the
Restatement standard for public nuisance when discussing whether the
43
plaintiffs had pled a valid cause of action.
Generally, a public nuisance is an interference with rights common to the general public such as public health, safety, morals,
44
peace, comfort, or convenience. The Restatement also provides that
interference with a public right is unreasonable if “the conduct is
proscribed by a statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation,
or . . . is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent or
long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has
45
a significant effect upon the public right.”

40

See, e.g., In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 495 (N.J. 2007) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. c (1979)).
41
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B.
42
See, e.g., Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n v. City of New York, 616 F. 2d 1222, 1234
(3d. Cir. 1980), vacated, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). In National Sea Clammers Ass’n, Plaintiffs,
fisherman who fished the waters off the coast of New York and New Jersey, brought a
claim against defendants in federal public nuisance for discharging or permitting the
discharge of “nutrient-rich sewage and toxic wastes into the Atlantic Ocean or its tributaries.” Id. at 1224. Although the Supreme Court later vacated this decision because it determined that Plaintiffs’ federal public nuisance claims were displaced, the
circuit court adopted the Restatement definition of public nuisance in the context of
federal common law while holding in favor of the Plaintiffs. See id. at 1234.
43
See Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 350–52.
44
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(a).
45
§ 821B(2)(b), (c).
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Not all would-be plaintiffs have standing to bring a claim against
a defendant in tort for a public nuisance. In most instances, only a
state (or a state’s agent) or other public entity, such as a city, can initiate a claim for public nuisance, but individuals have standing in
46
such cases if they can prove a “special” damage. Thus, for individuals to plead a valid cause of action for public nuisance, they “must
have suffered harm of a kind different from that suffered by other
members of the public exercising the right common to the general
47
public that was the subject of interference.” On this basis, private
land trusts have initiated federal-nuisance actions seeking damages
48
and injunctive relief from emitters of GHGs. States and other government entities have initiated similar public-nuisance actions in
49
their representative capacity for the general public. Because air pollution is partially regulated by the federal government, the question
becomes whether plaintiffs in global-warming-as-public-nuisance actions still have a viable cause of action. Put another way, the issue is
whether the federal common law of public nuisance is displaced by
federal statutory and regulatory law in the context of GHG emissions.
B. Displacement
As an initial matter, “the concept of ‘displacement’ refers to a
situation in which ‘federal statutory law governs a question previously
50
the subject of federal common law.’” On the other hand, “preemption” refers to “a circumstance in which a federal statute super51
sedes state law.” In the words of Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
“determining if federal statutory law governs a question previously
the subject of federal common law is not the same as that employed
52
in deciding if federal common law pre-empts state law.” Courts,
however, often confuse these doctrines and use them interchangea-

46
See, e.g., In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 497–98 (N.J. 2007) (citing Poulos
v. Dover Boiler & Plate Fabricators, 76 A.2d 808, 811–12 (N.J. 1950)).
47
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(1).
48
See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y.
2005), rev’d, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (Dec. 6, 2010)
(No. 10-174).
49
See Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868
(N.D. Cal. 2009); California v. GMC, No. 06-05755, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2007); Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 267.
50
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 371 n.37 (2d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981)), cert. granted,
131 S. Ct. 813 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174).
51
Id.
52
Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 316.
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53

bly. All but one of the public-nuisance actions seeking relief for the
effects of global warming that have been filed to date have been
based on federal common law. The exception was Comer, where the
plaintiffs’ suit was based on, among other claims, state private and
54
public nuisance causes of action.
Federal common law is recognized only when state common law
is inadequate to deal with the issue presented. As the United States
Supreme Court has stated, “If state law can be applied, there is no
need for federal common law; if federal common law exists, it is be55
cause state law cannot be used.” Thus, federal and state common
law are mutually exclusive—where state common law is sufficient,
federal common law cannot be applied. In the air pollution context,
“[i]t is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that
the air over its territory should not be polluted on a great scale . . . .”
56
State law is insufficient to address these concerns because states, in
their sovereign capacity, would be seeking to enforce a cause of action outside their respective jurisdictions. With this in mind, courts
recognize federal common law when they are “compelled to consider
federal questions ‘which cannot be answered from federal statutes
57
alone.’” Therefore, in the context of air pollution, if a state brings a
cause of action in its sovereign capacity seeking redress for the emission of air pollution, the federal common law should apply unless
federal statutory or regulatory law has displaced it.
The power of courts to recognize federal common law “is subject
58
to the paramount authority of Congress.” Therefore, the legislative
branch may limit the courts’ ability to recognize federal common law.
This is because concerns over separation of powers prevent the courts
from determining what constitutes reasonableness when Congress

53

Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 371 n.37 (“[C]ourts have also frequently used
the word ‘pre-emption’ when discussing whether a statute displaces federal common
law.” (citing Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317 n.9; Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cnty.
of Oneida, 719 F.2d 525, 530 (2d Cir. 1983), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other
grounds, 470 U.S. 226 (1985))).
54
Although state public-nuisance claims were at issue in Comer, all other globalwarming-as-public-nuisance actions have been brought under federal common law.
As such, only federal common law and displacement jurisprudence will be discussed
in this Comment.
55
Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 314 n.7.
56
Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238 (1907).
57
Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 314 (quoting D’Oench Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315
U.S. 447, 469 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
58
Id. at 313–14 (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931)) (internal quotations omitted).
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59

has already spoken on the issue. In determining whether statutory
law has displaced federal common law, the main inquiry is whether
the problem presented to the court—previously governed by the
60
common law—has been sufficiently addressed in the legislation.
Federal common law applies until the point at which “the field has
been made the subject of comprehensive legislation or authorized ad61
ministrative standards.”
Unlike when determining whether an act of Congress has preempted state law, “evidence of a clear and manifest purpose is not required” when determining whether federal legislation or administra62
tive action has displaced federal common law. This is because displacement does not raise the issues of federalism present in a pre63
emption analysis. Beyond the foregoing, a “presumption favoring
64
retention of existing law” still applies, and “courts may take it as a
59
Id. at 315 (“Our ‘commitment to the separation of powers is too fundamental’
to continue to rely on federal common law ‘by judicially decreeing what accords with
common sense and the public weal’ when Congress has addressed the problem.”
(quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978))).
60
Id. at 315 n.8 (“[T]he question whether a previously available federal commonlaw action has been displaced by federal statutory law involves an assessment of the
scope of the legislation and whether the scheme established by Congress addresses
the problem formerly governed by federal common law.”). The Supreme Court has
also held that “an agency regulation with the force of law can pre-empt conflicting
state” law. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200 (2009) (citing Geier v. Am. Honda
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000); Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc.,
471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)). In such cases, a court should “perform[] its own conflict
determination.” Id. Although the Supreme Court has not addressed whether agency
regulation may displace federal common law, it stands to reason that agency regulation having the force of law should be given displacement effect when it “speaks directly” to the issue governed by the federal common law. Compare Connecticut v.
Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 381 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding global-warming-aspublic-nuisance actions were not displaced because GHGs were not regulated under
the CAA at the time of the decision), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No.
10-174), with New Eng. Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the CAA precluded the issuance of an injunction under federal common law
when the pollutant at issue was currently regulated under the Act).
61
Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 241 (10th Cir. 1971) (emphasis added). In
Pankey, the State of Texas sued eight owners and operators of ranch land in New
Mexico for their use of Toxaphene, a pesticide. Id. at 237. Plaintiffs argued that use
of this pesticide interfered with its citizens’ right to make use of the Canadian River,
which runs from New Mexico into Texas, by polluting this water. Id. at 237–38. The
court held that the plaintiffs had a right to a federal common law cause of action in
public nuisance. Id. at 241–42.
62
Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 316–17.
63
Id. (“[Federalism] concerns are not implicated in the same fashion when the
question is whether federal statutory or federal common law governs, and accordingly the same sort of evidence of a clear and manifest purpose is not required.”).
64
United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993).
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given that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the
[common law] principle will apply except ‘when a statutory purpose
65
to the contrary is evident.’” The ultimate question in a displacement analysis, however, is whether the legislative scheme has “spoken
66
directly to the question.” Further, all that matters is that the field is
occupied, “not whether it has been occupied in a particular man67
ner.” In other words, the only question in determining whether
federal statutory law displaces federal common law is whether the issue has been addressed in some manner. Whether the matter has
been addressed to the courts’ or the plaintiffs’ liking is of no concern. The Supreme Court has noted, for example, that “speaking directly” to the question at issue may, in some cases, require that the
“question” be as specific as a question of what damages are appropri68
ate. Federal common law can therefore exist only as a gap-filling
measure in areas that the legislative or regulatory scheme has not
69
previously addressed.
In the landmark case Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), the Supreme Court held that the City of Milwaukee had a valid cause of action in federal public nuisance against the State of Illinois for its pol70
lution of interstate waters. Eventually, this case again worked its way
71
up to the Supreme Court in Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II). In
the interim, however, Congress had passed the Federal Water Pollu72
tion Control Act (FWPCA) Amendments of 1972. This set the stage
for the Court to determine whether these amendments displaced the
federal common law in the area of water pollution. The Supreme
Court concluded in Milwaukee II that Congress had “occupied the
field” of federal public nuisance law in the context of water pollution
“through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program
[i.e., the FWPCA] supervised by an expert administrative agency” and
73
thus, the federal common law was displaced. As the Court noted, at
65

Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (quoting
Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)).
66
Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 315.
67
Id. at 324.
68
Id. at 315 (noting that the federal statute at issue in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978), spoke to “the question of damages”).
69
See id. at 324 n.18.
70
Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91, 108 (1972).
71
451 U.S. 304.
72
See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (2006)); Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 310.
73
Id. at 317.
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the time of Milwaukee I, the FWPCA was merely “another law touching
interstate waters,” but the subsequent amendments “spoke directly”
to the issue by the time of Milwaukee II by creating a comprehensive
74
The Second Circuit has stated the rule exregulatory scheme.
pressed in Milwaukee II as
a strict test for determining the [displacement] effect of a federal
statute. Instead of inquiring whether ‘Congress ha[s] affirmatively proscribed the use of federal common law,’ we are to conclude
that federal common law has been [displaced] as to every question to which the legislative scheme ‘spoke directly,’ and every
75
problem that Congress has ‘addressed.’

No Supreme Court case has ever held that the CAA displaces
federal common law in regard to air pollution; nor has the Court addressed this issue. Two district courts, however, have held that the
76
CAA displaces the federal common law in this area. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in AEP—the only circuit court opinion to
address the displacement effect of the CAA on global-warming-as77
public-nuisance claims —explicitly rejected the conclusion of the two
district courts and criticized one court’s analysis for “equating the
CAA with the [FWPCA]—without further analyzing the two sta78
tutes.” In an earlier case, the Second Circuit held that the CAA
precluded the issuance of an injunction under federal common law,
but this was only in regard to a pollutant currently regulated under
79
the act. This was a narrow holding. The court did “not reach the
74

Id.
In re Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 335 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting Milwaukee
II, 451 U.S. at 315).
76
See Reeger v. Mill Serv. Inc., 593 F. Supp. 360, 363 (W.D. Pa. 1984); United
States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J. 1982).
77
The Fifth Circuit in Comer did not address the issue of displacement, and instead, the court focused its analysis on the issues of standing and the political question doctrine. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 860 (5th Cir. 2009), reh’g
granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010).
Further, the plaintiffs in Comer brought a cause of action for public nuisance under
state common law and therefore this would evoke a pre-emption, as opposed to a displacement, analysis. See id. (“The plaintiffs invoked the district court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. The plaintiffs do not assert any federal
or public law actions and do not seek injunctive relief.” (internal citations omitted)).
78
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 378 n.47 (2d Cir. 2009) (criticizing the court’s analysis in Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct.
813 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174).
79
New Eng. Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1981). The Second
Circuit, in Costle, determined that the plaintiffs had not pled a valid cause of action
seeking an injunction against defendants, Long Island Lighting Company, from
burning oil that contained sulphur. Id. at 33. The court reasoned that EPA’s approval of a State Implementation Plan (SIP) that included Long Island Lighting
75
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broad question of whether the Clean Air Act totally [displaces] federal common law nuisance actions based on emission of chemical pol80
lutants in the air.” In AEP, however, the Second Circuit found the
Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA helpful to its analy81
sis of the displacement issue.
The first question on the merits that the Court faced in Massachusetts was “whether § 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act authorizes
[the] EPA to regulate [GHG] emissions from new motor vehicles in
the event that it forms a ‘judgment’ that such emissions contribute to
82
climate change.” The EPA argued that carbon dioxide is not an “air
pollutant” within the meaning of the CAA and therefore it had no ju83
risdiction over its regulation. The Court reasoned, however, that
84
the statute is unambiguous and embraces all airborne compounds.
Thus, the Court concluded that the EPA has authority to regulate
85
GHGs under the CAA. This holding indicated to the Second Circuit
that the CAA requires regulation of GHGs only when the EPA has decided that emission of GHGs presents a danger to human health and
welfare and does not, of necessity, speak to the question of GHG emis86
sions a priori. The CAA, therefore, authorizes the EPA to regulate
GHGs, but at the time AEP was decided no such regulations were in
effect. The proposed regulations were just that, merely proposed.
The CAA, along with its then-current regulations, did not speak to
the issue of GHG emissions and thus did not displace federal public
87
nuisance claims for the effects of global warming. Such displace88
ment, however, may occur at some future date.
Ultimately, the
court determined that the CAA (absent an endangerment finding as
to, and other regulation concerning, GHGs) was more akin to the
state of the FWPCA at the time Milwaukee I was decided, as opposed

Company’s use of the high-sulfur fuel precluded plaintiffs from maintaining a common law cause of action. Id. at 32–33.
80
Id. at 32.
81
Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 378–80.
82
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007).
83
Id. at 511–12.
84
Id. at 528–29; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2006).
85
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532.
86
See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 379 (2d Cir. 2009), cert.
granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174).
87
See id. at 379–81.
88
Id. (“We cannot say, therefore, that EPA’s issuance of proposed findings suffice
to regulate greenhouse gases in a way that ‘speaks directly’ to Plaintiffs’ problems
and thereby displaces Plaintiffs’ existing remedies under the federal common law.”
(citing Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 319–24 (1981))).

GRIMM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

4/12/2011 9:16 AM

685

COMMENT

to the version of the FWPCA in place at the time of Milwaukee II, and
89
therefore did not displace the federal common law. The emphasis
placed on the possibility of the CAA’s displacement capacity in regard
to global-warming-as-public-nuisance claims requires further consideration of the scope and structure of the CAA to determine the contours of what this displacement may be.
C. The Clean Air Act
90

Congress enacted the CAA in 1955, and the Act has since been
91
amended on several occasions.
The purpose of the CAA is to,
among other things, “protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s
air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the
92
productive capacity of its population.” The CAA generally treats stationary and mobile sources, as well as fuel content, differently.
“Broadly speaking, Title I of the statute regulates stationary sources of
pollution and Title II regulates [fuel content and] mobile sources,
93
most importantly motor vehicles.”
1.

Stationary Sources

Under the present framework of the CAA, in regulating stationary sources, the Administrator of the EPA is required to identify
“criteria” air pollutants that are reasonably anticipated to “endanger
94
public health or welfare.” Additionally, the EPA must find that “the
presence of [the criteria pollutant] in the ambient air results from
95
numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources.” This is called an
endangerment finding. Stationary sources are “generally any source
of an air pollutant except those emissions resulting directly from an
internal combustion engine for transportation purposes or from a
96
nonroad engine or nonroad vehicle.” Once a criteria pollutant has
89

Id. at 380.
See Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322.
91
See Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 1, 77 Stat. 392; Pub. L. No. 89-272, Title I, § 101(2),
(3), 79 Stat. 992; Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 2, 81 Stat. 485; Pub. L. No. 101-549, Title I, §
108(k), 104 Stat. 2468; see also Clean Air Act: History of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/caa_history.html (last visited Dec. 30,
2010).
92
42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2006).
93
Sierra Club v. Larson, 2 F.3d 462, 464 (1st Cir. 1993); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–
7513a (Title I), 7521–7590 (Title II) (2006).
94
§ 7408(a)(1)(A).
95
§ 7408(a)(1)(B).
96
Id. § 7602(z). The sources excepted from the definition of “stationary source”
are instead regulated under Title II of the CAA. See id. §§ 7521–7544.
90
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been identified pursuant to an endangerment finding, the Administrator must then promulgate a primary and secondary National Am97
bient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for that criteria pollutant. The
EPA establishes NAAQSs based on the permissible concentration of
each criteria pollutant in the ambient air measured by “parts per mil3
lion (ppm) by volume, milligrams per cubic meter of air (mg/m ),
98
3
and micrograms per cubic meter of air (μg/m ).” The Administrator is then required to review these NAAQSs at least once every five
99
years. Primary NAAQSs must allow for an “adequate margin of safe100
ty” necessary to protect the public health. Secondary NAAQSs must
“protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of such air pollutants in the am101
bient air.”
After NAAQSs are established for criteria pollutants, states—
through a cooperative federalism framework—must submit “a plan
which provides for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement
of such . . . standards in each air quality control region (or portion
102
thereof).” These are known as State Implementation Plans (SIPs).
103
The Administrator of the EPA then either accepts the SIP or must
promulgate a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) if the SIP is re104
jected. A FIP is meant to accomplish the goals of a SIP, but it is instead promulgated by the EPA as opposed to being promulgated by
105
In addition to establishing the framework of SIPs,
the state itself.
the CAA also regulates stationary sources by establishing a program
106
for both pre-construction and operating permits. Pre-construction
97

§ 7409(a)(2). Primary NAAQS are meant to address dangers directly to human health, such as the possibility of disease by exposure to these pollutants. See 40
C.F.R. § 50.2(b) (2010). Secondary NAAQS, on the other hand, deal with matters of
human welfare, which means protection “from any known or anticipated adverse effects of a pollutant.” Id. The EPA generally only issues one NAAQS, however, which
is meant to satisfy both the primary and secondary NAAQSs. See, e.g., id. § 50.12.
98
Air and Radiation: National Ambient Air Quality Standards, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://epa.gov/air/criteria.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2010).
99
§ 7409(d)(1).
100
§ 7409(b)(1).
101
§ 7409(b)(2).
102
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2006). Air quality control regions consist of the area
within a state—possibly divided into two or more separate regions—that states must
consider for purposes of developing and carrying out SIPs. See id. §7407.
103
See id. § 7410(a)(3)(B).
104
§ 7410(c)(1).
105
See § 7410(c).
106
See id. §§ 7470–7492, 7501–7509a, 7511–7513a, 7661–7661f; see also discussion
infra Part II.C.1.a–b.
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permits are further divided into two separate categories based on
whether the air quality control region in which the source is located
107
has reached attainment levels.
Combined, these pre-construction
108
programs are called New Source Review (NSR).
a.

Pre-Construction Permits: Prevention of Significant
Deterioration and Nonattainment New Source Review

After establishing NAAQSs, the CAA promulgates two separate
pre-construction permitting programs. The first, called the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program, applies to new major stationary sources and “major modifications” to existing major stationary sources found within attainment areas (i.e., areas that have
109
met the NAAQSs on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis).
Determining
whether the PSD program is applicable to a particular emitter of pollution requires an inquiry into “whether the proposed project is sufficiently large (in terms of its emissions) to be a major stationary
110
source or major modification.”
Major stationary sources are those
that emit at least one hundred tons per year (tpy) of any pollutant
“subject to regulation” by the CAA for a list of twenty-eight source
111
categories or, alternatively, any source that emits two hundred fifty
112
tpy of any pollutant from any other unlisted source. Major modifi107

See §§ 7470–7492, 7501–7509a, 7511–7513a.
See 40 C.F.R. § 51 app. W(1.0)(a) (2010) (describing prevention of significant
deterioration as part of new source review).
109
§§ 7470–7492.
110
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,297 (proposed Oct. 27, 2009) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71).
111
These sources include
fossil-fuel fired steam electric plants of more than two hundred and fifty million British thermal units per hour heat input, coal cleaning
plants (thermal dryers), kraft pulp mills, Portland Cement plants, primary zinc smelters, iron and steel mill plants, primary aluminum ore
reduction plants, primary copper smelters, municipal incinerators capable of charging more than fifty tons of refuse per day, hydrofluoric,
sulfuric, and nitric acid plants, petroleum refineries, lime plants, phosphate rock processing plants, coke oven batteries, sulfur recovery
plants, carbon black plants (furnace process), primary lead smelters,
fuel conversion plants, sintering plants, secondary metal production facilities, chemical process plants, fossil-fuel boilers of more than two
hundred and fifty million British thermal units per hour heat input,
petroleum storage and transfer facilities with a capacity exceeding
three hundred thousand barrels, taconite ore processing facilities, glass
fiber processing plants, charcoal production facilities.
§ 7479(1).
112
Id.
108
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cations, on the other hand, refer to any major physical changes that
result in an increase in emissions that is “significant” (i.e., equal to or
113
above the “significance” level as defined by the EPA).
Recently, a debate has arisen over the interpretation of the
words “subject to regulation” under the CAA. Some have argued that
these words are synonymous with simply being subject to the monitoring and reporting requirements of the Act (which includes a much
broader spectrum of pollutants) while others have argued that this
phrase applies to those pollutants whose emissions are subject to control under other sections of the CAA (i.e., whose emission levels are
114
regulated). The Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) in In re Deseret Power Electric Cooperative rejected an argument by the EPA, region
8, that historic precedent bound its interpretation of “subject to regulation” to mean that only those pollutants already subject to control
over emissions by other sections of the CAA are subject to the PSD
115
program.
The EAB, however, also rejected the argument that the
words “subject to regulation” require the application of the PSD program to any source subject to monitoring and reporting require116
ments.
Following this case, the EPA Administrator at that time,
Stephen Johnson, issued a memorandum interpreting “subject to
regulation” to mean “subject to either a provision in the CAA or regulation adopted by EPA under the CAA that requires actual control of
117
emissions of that pollutant.”
The EPA has since reconsidered this
interpretation, but in early 2010 the EPA made clear that it agrees
with its initial analysis that the words “subject to regulation” should
118
be synonymous with actual control of emissions under the Act.
113

40 C.F.R. § 52.21(a)(2)(iv)(a) (2010).
See In re Deseret Power Elec. Coop., No. 07-03, 2008 EPA App. LEXIS 47, at *1–
3 (2008).
115
Id. at *5–6; see also Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD): Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered by the Federal PSD Permit Program, 74 Fed. Reg. 51,535, 51,538 (Oct. 7, 2009).
116
In re Deseret Power Elec. Coop., 2008 EPA App. LEXIS 47, at *4–5; see also Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD): Reconsideration of Interpretation of
Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered by the Federal PSD Permit Program,
74 Fed. Reg. at 51,538.
117
Memorandum from Stephen Johnson, Envtl. Prot. Agency Adm’r, to Envtl.
Prot.
Agency
Reg’l
Adm’rs
1
(Dec.
18,
2008),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/NSR/documents/psd_interpretive_memo_12.18.08.pdf; see also
Clean Air Act Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Construction Permit
Program; Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered by the
Federal PSD Permit Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 80,300 (Dec. 31, 2008) (public notice of
Dec. 18, 2008 memo).
118
See Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants
Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004, 17,004 (Apr. 2,
114
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Once it is determined that the PSD program applies to a particular source, to obtain a pre-construction permit, the regulated source
must agree to construct the Best Available Control Technology
(BACT) and make use of such technology once construction is com119
plete. What is considered to be the BACT is determined on a case120
by-case basis. Additionally, a source regulated by the PSD program
is required to refrain from causing or contributing to pollution that
results in levels prohibited by the CAA (i.e., results in nonattainment
121
for the region on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis).
The second pre-construction permitting program, called nonattainment NSR, is found in Part D of the CAA and governs sources
within nonattainment areas (i.e., areas that have not met the
122
NAAQSs). Because GHGs are not currently regulated under Title I
of the CAA (nor is regulation under Title I currently proposed), and
thus, no NAAQSs are being proposed for GHGs, all areas in the
123
country are therefore in attainment.
Accordingly, the nonattainment NSR program is irrelevant to this discussion.
b.

Title V Operating Permits

Beyond the pre-construction permits under the PSD and nonattainment NSR programs, Title V of the CAA sets out the overarching
permitting process for all stationary sources once a stationary source
124
becomes operational.
Generally, the Title V program applies to
major stationary sources, defined as those that emit one-hundred tpy
of any pollutant, ten tpy of any “hazardous” pollutant, or twenty-five
2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 51, 70, 71) (“After considering comments
on alternate interpretations of [the term ‘subject to regulation’], EPA has decided to
continue to interpret it to include each pollutant subject to either a provision in the
CAA or regulation adopted by EPA under the CAA that requires actual control of
emissions of that pollutant.”).
119
42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2006).
120
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,298 (proposed Oct. 27, 2009) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71) (describing the “top-down” approach taken by the EPA, in
which all available control technologies are identified, technically infeasible options
are eliminated, and a decision is then made from the remaining sources based on
control and cost effectiveness); see also 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(12) (2010).
121
§ 7475(a)(3).
122
Id. §§ 7501–7509a, 7511–7513a.
123
Perhaps more accurately, the attainment/nonattainment distinction simply
does not apply, but this difference is merely one of semantics for the purposes of this
discussion. What is important to understand is that the nonattainment NSR permitting program is not implicated by any of the proposed regulations concerning GHG
emissions.
124
42 U.S.C. §§ 7661–7661f (2006).
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tpy of any combination of “hazardous” pollutants. In addition, Title
V regulation applies to any affected source subject to the acid rain
sections of the CAA, any source requiring a permit under the PSD or
nonattainment NSR program, or any other source designated by
126
rule. The substantive requirements for stationary sources under the
CAA are found within the NAAQSs and the emission control tech127
nology requirements of the pre-construction permits. The permit128
ting program of Title V serves merely as a means of enforcement.
According to the EPA: “Title V generally does not add new substantive requirements for pollution control, but it does require that each
permit contain all of a facility’s ‘applicable requirements’ under the
CAA, and that certain procedural requirements be followed, especial129
ly with respect to compliance with these requirements.” Without a
permit, a source emitting a criteria pollutant above levels triggering
130
application of Title V may not be in operation.
2.

Mobile Sources

Mobile sources, as defined under the CAA, include “any class or
131
classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines.”
To
regulate mobile sources under the CAA, the Administrator of the
EPA must make a finding that an “air pollutant from any class or
classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in
his [or her] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution . . . may
132
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”
133
This is called an endangerment and cause or contribute finding.
Once an endangerment and cause or contribute finding is made by
the EPA Administrator pursuant to § 202, “[t]he CAA regulates mo-

125

§ 7661(2)(A)–(B).
§ 7661a(a).
127
See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,298 (proposed Oct. 27, 2009) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71).
128
See id.
129
Id.
130
§ 7661a(a).
131
Id. § 7521(a)(1).
132
Id.
133
See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886, 18,890 (proposed
Apr. 24, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1) (“Section 202(a) sets forth a twopart predicate for regulatory action under that provision: endangerment and cause
or contribute.”).
126
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bile sources primarily by requiring standards for tailpipe emissions.”
Furthermore, “[w]hile states have significant latitude in setting stationary source emissions limits to meet the NAAQS, the Act reserves
to the federal government exclusive authority to regulate motor ve135
hicle emissions.”
3.

Fuel and Fuel Additives

Similar to new motor vehicle and new motor vehicle engine regulation, the Administrator can regulate fuel and fuel additives
for use in a motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine, or nonroad engine or nonroad vehicle
(A) if in the judgment of the Administrator any emission
product of such fuel or fuel additives causes, or contributes,
to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger the public health or welfare, or
(B) if emission products of such fuel or additive will impair
to a significant degree the performance or any emission con136
trol device or system.

Under this provision, the EPA can “prohibit the manufacture, introduction into commerce, offering for sale, or sale” of any such regu137
lated fuel. Clearly, Congress intended separate means of regulation
for stationary, mobile, and fuel sources under the CAA. Stationary
sources are governed by the establishment of NAAQSs and a permitting program used to enforce such standards, along with require138
ments for the emission control technology used.
Mobile sources,
on the other hand, are regulated by the adoption of tailpipe-emission
standards and a prohibition on the sale of those mobile sources
139
which do not meet those standards.
Lastly, fuel sources are regu140
lated by prohibiting certain fuel content or additives.
D. Setting the Stage for New Regulation
In 2007, the United States Supreme Court handed down its most
important decision to date concerning the CAA and global climate

134
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 376 n.45 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing § 7521), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174).
135
Id. (citing § 7543).
136
42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1) (2006).
137
Id.
138
See supra Part II.C.1.a–b.
139
See supra Part II.C.2.
140
§ 7545(c)(1).
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141

change, Massachusetts v. EPA.
Leading up to this case, in October
1999, nineteen environmental and renewable energy industry organizations filed a rulemaking petition to force the EPA to regulate car142
bon dioxide under the CAA.
When the EPA declined, suit fol143
lowed. The first issue that the Court had to decide in Massachusetts
144
v. EPA was whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue.
The court
decided that, yes, the plaintiffs did have the requisite standing neces145
sary to challenge the EPA’s denial of its rulemaking petition.
It
then turned to the merits of the case.
The first question on the merits that the Court addressed was
whether § 202(a)(1) of the CAA gives the EPA the authority to regulate GHGs from mobile sources if, in the judgment of the Administra141

549 U.S. 497 (2007).
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886, 18,889 (proposed Apr.
24, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).
143
See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 510–14.
144
Id. at 516–28.
145
Id. at 526. First, the Court stated that the case before it did not raise a political
question, would not result in an advisory opinion, nor had it been mooted by subsequent developments, all of which would have been fatal to the plaintiff’s standing.
Id. at 516. Ultimately, the Court determined that the state of Massachusetts had
standing to sue in its “quasi-sovereign,” or parens patriae, capacity. Id. at 520 n.17.
Litigating as parens patriae allows a state to protect “public or governmental interests
that concern the state as a whole.” Id. (quoting RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J.
MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 289 (5th ed. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court
reasoned that plaintiffs could prove an “injury in fact” based on the scientific evidence indicating that global warming would likely raise sea-levels and therefore, the
state would permanently lose land by inundation, among other negative consequences. Id. at 521–23. The majority rebuffed the Chief Justice’s argument in dissent that Massachusetts could not quantify its projected land loss and that therefore
its submission was “conclusory.” Id. at 523 n.21. Instead, the majority countered, the
likelihood that “Massachusetts’s coastline will recede has nothing to do with whether
petitioners have documented the precise metes and bounds of their soon-to-beflooded land.” Id. Next, the Court rejected the EPA’s argument that the necessary
causation needed to confer standing was lacking. Id. at 523–25. The EPA argued
that “its decision not to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles
contributes so insignificantly to [Massachusetts’s] injuries that the agency cannot be
haled into federal court to answer for them.” Id. at 523. The Court reasoned that
the assumption that a small, incremental step can never be attacked in a federal
court was erroneous because this would “doom most challenges to regulatory action.”
Id. at 524. Lastly, the Court concluded that, although the EPA could not reverse
global warming, this did not mean that there was not sufficient standing for the
Court to decide “whether EPA has a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it.” Id. at 525.
The EPA’s own actions indicated its belief that it could in fact help slow or reduce
global climate change. Id. at 526. Thus, with all three requirements of standing satisfied—injury in fact, causation, and redressability—the Court held that plaintiffs
had the requisite standing to permit a decision on the merits. Id.
142
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tor, such emissions detrimentally affect public health and welfare.
The EPA argued that carbon dioxide is not an “air pollutant” within
147
the meaning of the CAA.
The Court reasoned, however, that the
statute was unambiguous and that the plain meaning of the relevant
CAA provision “embraces all airborne compounds of whatever stripe,
and underscores that intent through the repeated use of the word
148
‘any.’”
Under this interpretation, the CAA clearly allows for the
149
regulation of GHGs under § 202 of the Act.
The second question on the merits was whether the EPA’s reason for not regulating GHGs under the CAA—that even if it did have
statutory authority, regulating GHGs under the CAA would be un150
wise—was a valid use of its discretion. On this point, the Supreme
Court held that the EPA “can avoid taking further action only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change
or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or
151
will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do.”
Thus, refusing to regulate GHGs under the CAA because other executive-branch programs already govern global warming, because regulating GHGs under the Act might impair the President’s diplomatic negotiations, or because the approach might be inefficient and
152
piece-meal were not valid reasons for failing to regulate.
In other
words, the Supreme Court mandated that the EPA must either decide
that GHGs are dangerous to human health and welfare and therefore
regulate them under the CAA, or it must decide that they are not
dangerous to human health and welfare and not regulate them under the CAA. If there is not enough information to determine
whether GHGs are a danger to human health and welfare, the EPA
153
must say so unambiguously.
146

Id. at 528.
Id. at 513.
148
Id. at 528–29; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2006) (“The term ‘air pollutant’
means any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical,
chemical, biological, radioactive . . . substance or matter which is emitted into or
otherwise enters the ambient air. Such term includes any precursors to the formation of any air pollutant . . . .”).
149
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532.
150
Id. at 532.
151
Id. at 533.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 534.
Nor can EPA avoid its statutory obligation by noting the uncertainty
surrounding various features of climate change and concluding that it
would therefore be better not to regulate at this time. If the scientific
uncertainty is so profound that it precludes EPA from making a rea147
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The Court was also explicit in stating that it did not reach the
question of whether the EPA must make an endangerment finding as
154
to GHGs under the Act. Regardless, because of the emerging consensus regarding human-induced global climate change throughout
155
the scientific community, the Court’s decision essentially tied the
EPA’s hands, making it clear that regulation would soon follow.
III. A FINAL ENDANGERMENT AND CAUSE OR CONTRIBUTE FINDING,
THE “LIGHT DUTY VEHICLE” RULE, AND THE “TAILORING” RULE
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,
the Administrator of the EPA under President George W. Bush, Stephen Johnson, issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
to seek public comment on how the EPA should respond to this deci156
sion.
Then, in April 2009, Lisa Jackson, the new Administrator of
the EPA, promulgated a proposed endangerment and cause or con157
tribute finding as to GHGs under the Act. This rule became final in
158
December of 2009. In addition, the EPA has finalized the adoption
of tailpipe emission standards for light-duty motor vehicles in accor159
dance with this endangerment and cause or contribute finding.

soned judgment as to whether greenhouse gases contribute to global
warming, EPA must say so.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
154
Id. at 534–35 (“We need not and do not reach the question whether on remand EPA must make an endangerment finding, or whether policy concerns can inform EPA’s actions in the event that it makes such a finding.”).
155
See supra note 7.
156
Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg.
44,354 (proposed July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).
157
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886 (proposed Apr. 24,
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).
158
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15,
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1). Although this rule has been made final,
court challenges await. Sixteen parties have filed suit against the EPA seeking to prevent the EPA’s endangerment and cause or contribute finding from taking effect.
Robin Bravender, 16 ‘Endangerment’ Lawsuits Filed Against EPA Before Deadline, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/02/17/17greenwire-16endangerment-lawsuits-filed-against-epa-bef-74640.html.
159
Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536–38). Proposed
standards have also been promulgated for medium- and heavy-duty vehicles. See
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 75 Fed. Reg. 74,152 (proposed November 30, 2010) (to be codified at C.F.R.
pts. 85, 86, 1036, 1037, 1065, 1066, 1068).
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Furthermore, Administrator Jackson issued additional proposed regulations pursuant to which the EPA is seeking to regulate large sta160
tionary sources according to a new “tailoring” rule. In June of 2010,
161
this rule became finalized.
The “tailoring” rule restricts the application of the PSD and the Title V permitting programs to only those
162
stationary sources that omit large amounts of GHGs. These regulations are important to a displacement analysis because it is possible
that they “speak directly” to the questions presented by globalwarming-as-public-nuisance claims.
A. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Finding and the “LightDuty” Vehicle Rule
The final endangerment and cause or contribute finding takes
163
action only under § 202 of the CAA. This is the section of the Act
that governs mobile sources (i.e., new motor vehicles and new motor
vehicle engines), and the EPA is not proposing to regulate stationary
sources or fuel content under this rulemaking. In the Administrator’s own words, “EPA is not proposing or taking action under any
other provision of the Clean Air Act” besides under § 202 in this reg164
ulation.
In this final endangerment and cause or contribute finding, the
EPA will regulate six different GHGs, which include carbon dioxide
(CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons
165
(HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6).
More specifically, “the Administrator finds that the air pollution is the
combined mix of six key directly-emitted, long-lived and well-mixed
greenhouse gases . . . , which together, constitute the root cause of
human-induced climate change and the resulting impacts on public
166
health and welfare.”
Through a definition of air pollution as the
160

See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292 (proposed Oct. 27, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 51, 52, 70, 71).
161
See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52,
70, 71).
162
See infra Part III.B.
163
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886, 18,888 (proposed Apr.
24, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).
164
Id.
165
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,516–17
(Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).
166
Id. at 66,516 (emphasis added).
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mixture of these six GHGs, “the Administrator is identifying the fundamental and underlying driver of human-induced climate change,
which, in turn, . . . poses risks to human health, society, and the envi167
ronment.” According to the court’s interpretation in AEP, the administrator was proposing to find (and since the final rulemaking,
has found) four distinct things: (1) that GHGs endanger human
health and welfare; (2) that this is caused specifically by the six
named gases in the proposed rulemaking; (3) that four of these gases
(CO2, CH4, N2O, and HFCs) are emitted from motor vehicles and
contribute to the concentration of GHGs in the air; and (4) that
these emissions from motor vehicles therefore contribute to the en168
dangerment of human health and welfare.
This final endangerment and cause or contribute finding is only
the first step in regulating GHG emissions from mobile sources. After the release of the proposed endangerment and cause or contribute finding but prior to the final rule, the EPA, along with the De169
partment of Transportation, issued a joint proposed rulemaking.
The purpose of this joint rulemaking was, among other things, to set
170
emission standards for light-duty vehicles. In May of 2010, this pro171
posed rulemaking was finalized and given effect. This rulemaking
is the final step in regulating GHG emissions for light-duty mobile
sources. In November 2010, the EPA released proposed standards
for medium- and heavy-duty vehicles, although these regulations have
172
not been finalized.

167

Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. at 18,896.
168
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 377 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. at 18,886), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813
(Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174).
169
Proposed Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. 49,454
(proposed Sept. 28, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86, 600, 49 C.F.R. pts. 531,
533, 537, 538).
170
See id.
171
Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536–38).
172
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and
Vehicles, 75 Fed. Reg. 74,152 (proposed Nov. 30, 2010) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts.
85, 86, 1036, 1037, 1065, 1066, 1068).
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B. The “Tailoring” Rule
The EPA has made clear that it considers promulgation of the
light-duty vehicle regulations that have since been finalized as triggering pre-construction NSR and Title V permitting regulations for ma173
jor stationary sources. Because many sources emit GHGs above the
level at which NSR and Title V are triggered (one hundred or two
hundred fifty tpy, depending on the source) but do not emit other
pollutants at significant levels (and therefore are not otherwise subject to the permitting scheme), many small sources would be newly
174
burdened by regulation of GHGs under the CAA. Recognizing that
this would result in a large influx of new sources coming under the
permitting regulation of the CAA that are not currently subject to this
175
section of the Act’s reach, the EPA proposed a “tailoring” rule.
Pursuant to the “tailoring” rule, the emission levels at which the
PSD and Title V permitting schemes become applicable to stationary
176
sources for their emission of GHGs is increased.
The EPA has
adopted a two-step approach to phase in certain sources. During the
first phase, the applicability threshold for both PSD and Title V regu177
lation of GHGs is set at 75,000 tpy on a CO2-equivalent (“CO2e”) basis, “but only if the project also significantly increases emissions of at

173
See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,300 (proposed Oct. 27, 2009) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71) (“[A]s soon as GHGs become regulated under the lightduty motor vehicle rule, GHG emissions will be considered pollutants ‘subject to
regulation’ under the CAA and will becomes subject to PSD and title V requirements.”). This is a result of the EPA’s interpretation of the words “subject to regulation,” discussed supra Part II.C.1.a. By defining “subject to regulation” to mean any
control over emission levels, the light-duty vehicle regulation triggers the PSD program. Also as discussed supra Part II.C.1.a, only PSD, and not nonattainment NSR, is
triggered for pre-construction permits because no endangerment finding has been
promulgated pursuant to § 108 of the CAA and therefore all sources are, by necessity, in attainment.
174
See id. at 55,294.
175
See id. (recognizing that “many small sources would be burdened by the costs
of individualized PSD control technology requirements and permit applications” and
that this would “paralyze” state permitting authorities by “vastly exceed[ing] the current administrative resources of the permitting authorities”).
176
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51,
52, 70, 71).
177
All GHGs are scored according to their potential warming effect on global
temperature. See Clean Energy: Greenhouse Gas Equivalencies Calculator, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-resources/calculator.html
(last visited Dec. 30, 2010). Carbon dioxide (CO2) is used as a baseline measure and
therefore this standard is referred to as a pollutant’s CO2-equivalent. See id.
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178

least one non-GHG pollutant.” The second phase begins on July 1,
2011, and during this phase, the applicability threshold is set at
100,000 tpy for all stationary sources regardless of whether the source
179
emits other non-GHG pollutants.
Further, the PSD “significance”
180
level is proposed to be set at 750,000 tpy CO2e. This rule affects only the applicability threshold for GHGs and not other gases currently
regulated under the CAA. Under the “tailoring” rule, the EPA is required to revisit these levels within five years in order to reevaluate
their viability, along with the viability of streamlining techniques de181
veloped to better process permitting requirements. The EPA claims
to have the authority to promulgate this regulation based on the sta182
tutory text of the CAA, which states in relevant part that the Administrator may “prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out
183
The EPA also relies on the legal
his functions under [the CAA].”
doctrines of “absurd results” and “administrative necessity” to justify
184
its promulgation of the “tailoring” rule.
Although these doctrines
are rarely used, the EPA believes that regulation of GHGs under the
185
CAA presents a viable application of the doctrines.
The power to promulgate administrative rulemakings pursuant
to the “absurd results” doctrine is not found in any statutory text. According to the EPA, courts are reluctant to invoke the “absurd results” doctrine “because it entails departing from the literal applica186
tion of statutory provisions.” Generally, under a Chevron analysis, an
agency (or a court reviewing an agency action) must take a two-step
187
approach in its interpretation of statutory text.
First, the court or
agency must determine whether the plain language of the statutory
178
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,516.
179
Id.
180
Id. As discussed supra Part II.C.1.a, “significance” levels are important in determining whether a major stationary source has undertaken a “major modification”
and therefore becomes subject to the PSD permitting program.
181
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,516.
182
Id.
183
42 U.S.C. § 7601 (2006).
184
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,516.
185
See id. at 31,533.
186
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,303 (proposed Oct. 27, 2009) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71).
187
Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984).
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text is clear; if so, then the agency must follow the plain language.
Second, if the statutory text is unclear, the agency’s interpretation of
189
the statutory text must be “reasonable.”
The “absurd results” doctrine, however, allows a deviation from the first step of a Chevron analysis. As the Supreme Court has stated, “The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the ‘rare cases [in which] the
literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at
odds with the intentions of its drafters.’ In such cases, the intention
190
of the drafters, rather than the strict language, controls.”
In addition, when applying the “absurd results” doctrine, an
agency “may deviate no further from the statute than is needed to
191
protect congressional intent.” Due to the large influx of permit applications that would result without the “tailoring” rule in place, the
192
EPA argues that congressional intent would be disrupted.
Specifically, the EPA argues that it would be impossible to administer the
permits within twelve months as required by the Act and that this
would create a backlog that would disrupt administration for years to
193
come. Therefore, the “absurd results” doctrine is applicable to this
situation.
Authority to promulgate the “tailoring” rule is also found, ac194
cording to the EPA, in the doctrine of “administrative necessity.”
This rule is different from the general rule that agencies may take
administrative factors into consideration when establishing rules because the “administrative necessity” doctrine involves deviation from
195
the statutory text.
The doctrine has largely developed within the
D.C. Circuit, which stated in its seminal case Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,
188

Id.
Id.
190
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v.
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
191
Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
192
See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516, 31,533 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71).
193
Id.
194
See id. at 31,543–44.
195
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,312 (proposed Oct. 27, 2009) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71) (“While these cases support the general proposition that
administrative considerations are important, they differ from the ‘administrative necessity’ doctrine because in those cases, the Agency’s actions were within the ambit of
the statutory language; whereas under the ‘administrative necessity’ doctrine, the
Agency’s actions depart from the statutory language.”).
189
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Certain limited grounds for the creation of exemptions are
inherent in the administrative process, and their unavailability
under a statutory scheme should not be presumed, save in the
face of the most unambiguous demonstration of congressional intent to foreclose them.
...
[There is] substantive authority [for an agency] to take appropriate action to cope with the administrative impossibility of
196
applying the commands of the substantive statute.

Considerations that can be taken into account when deviating from
the statutory text include the volume and the nature of the task, the
197
agency’s financial and personnel resources, and time constraints.
Demonstrating the applicability of the “administrative necessity” doc198
Of particular importrine, however, involves a “heavy burden.”
tance to the EPA in its argument for the applicability of the doctrine
was that enforcement of the PSD program was at issue in Alabama
199
Power Co. The court stated, “EPA does have discretion, in administering the statute’s ‘modification’ provision, to exempt from PSD review some emission increases on grounds of de minimis or administra200
tive necessity.”
Under this doctrine, the EPA must make the PSD and Title V
permitting programs “administratable” by streamlining definitions
and operative requirements. The EPA attempts to do this by refining
the definition of “potential to emit” and by establishing presumptive
201
BACTs. Essentially, under the “tailoring” rule, the EPA is adopting
the approach that only large emitters of GHGs should come under
the permitting programs of the CAA and is attempting to exempt stationary sources that emit only small amounts of GHGs.
IV. THE DISPLACEMENT SCHEME
Regulation of GHGs under the CAA would arguably lead to dis202
placement of the federal common law.
At least one commentator

196

Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 357–59 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Id. at 359.
198
Id.
199
See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 55,313.
200
Ala. Power Co., 636 F.2d at 400.
201
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 55,321–24.
202
See, e.g., Dan Mensher, Comment, Common Law on Ice: Using Federal Judge-Made
Nuisance Law to Address the Interstate Effects of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 ENVTL. L.
197
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has also pointed out that the CAA, without an endangerment finding
officially adopted, does not, on its own, displace the federal common
203
law in cases involving GHG emissions. The Second Circuit in AEP
seemed acutely aware of this dichotomy in holding that the CAA did
204
not presently displace federal common law.
But the court made
clear that it “expressed no opinion at th[e] time as to whether the actual regulation of greenhouse gas emissions under the CAA by the
EPA, if and when such regulation should come to pass, would dis205
place [a] cause of action under the federal common law.” Because
the EPA’s proposed and final regulations only regulate GHGs under
certain sections of the CAA, however, the displacement scheme is not
so simple.
To “speak directly to the question,” as required to displace fed206
eral public nuisance actions, several issues must be addressed. First,
and most importantly, GHGs must be regulated under the Act. This
would require the necessary rulemaking by the EPA under its statutory authority. Under the final endangerment and cause or contribute
finding, “light-duty vehicle” rule, and “tailoring” rule, this does not
appear to be at issue, as the Administrator is proposing to do just
that—regulate GHGs under the CAA. Second, the CAA and its regulations must address the specific source of emissions. This is a key
distinction; without guidance as to what sources are to be regulated
under the CAA, the resulting structure may constitute just “another
207
law touching interstate [air pollution]” akin to the FWPCA in place
at the time of Milwaukee I (under which the federal common law was
not displaced) as opposed to the comprehensive regulation governing at the time of Milwaukee II (which did displace the federal com208
Lastly, any regulation of GHGs under the CAA must
mon law).
463, 484 (2007) (“Were . . . EPA to decide that the CAA did provide for the regulation of GHGs, this regulation would likely displace the common law.”).
203
See, e.g., P. Leigh Bausinger, Note, Welcome to the (Impenetrable) Jungle: Massachusetts v. EPA, the Clean Air Act and the Common Law of Public Nuisance, 53 VILL. L. REV.
527, 550–54 (2008).
204
See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 381 (2d Cir. 2009) (“In
sum, at least until EPA makes the requisite findings, for purposes of our displacement
analysis the CAA does not (1) regulate greenhouse gas emissions or (2) regulate such
emissions from stationary sources.” (emphasis added)), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813
(Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174).
205
Id.
206
See discussion supra Part II.B.
207
Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981).
208
In other words, the difference between the FWPCA at the time of Milwaukee I
and the FWPCA at the time of Milwaukee II was that prior to the 1972 Amendments,
the FWPCA was merely “another law touching interstate water” and was not a com-
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provide some sort of recourse for those injured by a violation of the
209
regulation.
The foregoing requires a displacement analysis to address two
different concerns. First, the contours of the regulations and the different treatment of stationary, mobile, and fuel sources under the
CAA must be addressed. Second, the difference between equitable
and legal remedies must be analyzed, specifically in the context of
remedies for past damages.
A. Displacement as to Mobile Sources
The ultimate contours of the regulation of tailpipe emission levels may change an analysis of displacement. Clearly, however, with
the final endangerment and cause or contribute finding officially
adopted and the “light-duty vehicle” rule put into effect, federal
common law nuisance actions against mobile sources would be displaced.
Under Title II of the CAA, the EPA may—after making an endangerment and cause and contribute finding—“prescribe . . . standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant” from mobile
210
sources.
This is exactly what the “light-duty vehicle” rule carries
out. Once standards such as the “light-duty vehicle” rule are established, the CAA provides a list of prohibitions in accordance with
211
those regulations.
For example, manufacturers of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines are prohibited from distributing
in commerce, selling, offering for sale, or importing into the United
States any such motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine that does not
212
meet the requirements of the regulation.
The CAA goes further
and provides a list of civil penalties for the violation of provisions un213
der the Act. The Act gives the Administrator the express authority
214
to file civil actions for these violations, or in lieu of filing a civil ac-

prehensive scheme that “spoke directly to the question.” Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at
317. If any regulations for GHGs are proposed pursuant to only some sections of the
CAA, then they may only “touch” GHG regulation and may not speak directly to the
question at issue. See infra Part IV.A–C.
209
See Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 237 (1985) (stating
that the federal statutory scheme did not speak to damages and therefore did not
displace federal common law).
210
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006).
211
See id. § 7522.
212
§ 7522(a)(1).
213
Id. § 7524(a).
214
§ 7524(b).
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tion, the Administrator may assess a civil penalty under the Act.
Additionally, the CAA provides a citizen-suit provision under which
any person may bring a civil action against any other person who has
violated an emission standard under the Act or failed to comply with
an order issued by “the Administrator or a State with respect to such a
216
standard or limitation.”
Thus, it would seem that any endangerment and cause or contribute finding for GHGs under § 202 of the CAA and subsequent
emission standards (as in the “light-duty vehicle” rule) would “speak
directly” to the harm caused by the release of GHG emissions by
these sources. Importantly, as the Supreme Court stated, the test is
“not whether [the field] has been occupied in a particular manner”
217
but whether the field has been occupied at all. Therefore, the fact
that civil penalties are assessed as opposed to damages (a substantively different concept) is of no importance. The fact that these substantive differences are of little importance in a displacement analysis
is further emphasized by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Friends of the
218
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. In that case,
the Supreme Court, faced with a citizen suit under the FWPCA, held
that “voluntary cessation of allegedly unlawful conduct ordinarily
219
does not suffice to moot a case.” In doing so, the majority argued
220
The Court
that the appellate court misunderstood civil penalties.
stated,
It can scarcely be doubted that, for a plaintiff who is injured
or faces the threat of future injury due to illegal conduct ongoing
at the time of suit, a sanction that effectively abates that conduct
and prevents its recurrence provides a form of redress. Civil penalties can fit that description. To the extent that they encourage
defendants to discontinue current violations and deter them from
committing future ones, they afford redress to citizen plaintiffs
who are injured or threatened with injury as a consequence of
221
ongoing unlawful conduct.

Thus, civil penalties can at times serve as a valid substitute for damages by redressing the identical harm. Providing statutory damages,
therefore, is not a necessary prerequisite for a finding of displace-

215
216
217
218
219
220
221

§ 7524(c).
Id. § 7604(a)(1).
Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 324 (1981).
528 U.S. 167 (2000).
Id. at 174.
Id.
Id. at 185–86.

GRIMM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

704

4/12/2011 9:16 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:671

ment; statutory civil penalties are sufficient to displace the common
law. The question of displacement then turns to whether the statutory language is sufficiently comprehensive to cover all sources.
In the same way that the FWPCA regulated all point sources and
thus displaced federal nuisance actions in the water pollution context
in Milwaukee II, all mobile sources would similarly be regulated under
the CAA by a requisite endangerment and cause or contribute finding combined with subsequent regulation. Importantly, the emission
standards are directly regulated as well, and thus the “issue” of global
climate change (i.e., the emission of GHGs) is directly spoken to.
This would seemingly immunize automobile and engine manufacturers from federal public-nuisance claims seeking redress for their contributions to the emission of GHGs. Nuisance suits, such as that in222
itiated by the Attorney General of California,
against car
manufacturers would therefore be displaced to the extent that they
seek injunctive relief or damages for present and future (but not pre223
regulation) harm.
In California v. GMC, the People of the State of California sued
six automakers seeking damages for their contribution to global
224
warming. Although the district court dismissed the suit on politicalquestion grounds, a similar case would likely be dismissed on displacement grounds because tailpipe emission levels are capped pursuant to the final endangerment and cause or contribute finding and
the “light-duty vehicle” rule. The Attorney General of California may
have been aware that he would face a battle with respect to displacement. While this case was pending on appeal, the plaintiff-appellant,
the People of the State of California, moved to voluntarily dismiss the
225
appeal.
The plaintiff proffered two reasons for this voluntary dismissal. Although one reason for voluntarily dismissing the claim was
that several of the defendant motor companies subsequently filed for
bankruptcy, the other was that federal action had been taken, including the EPA’s acknowledgement that carbon dioxide and other
226
GHGs pose a danger to public health and are soon to be regulated.
This regulation was enough to seemingly satisfy one litigant that suf-

222

California v. GMC, No. 06-05755, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
27, 2007).
223
A suit seeking monetary relief for past damages (i.e., prior to regulation)
caused by the release of GHGs may not be displaced. See infra Part IV.D.
224
GMC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at *1.
225
Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Appeal, California v. GMC, No. 07-16908 (9th
Cir. filed June 19, 2009).
226
Id.
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ficient action had been taken by the federal government on the issue
of GHG emissions. More importantly, however, it is likely to satisfy
courts that federal legislation and administrative action has spoken
directly to the issue of global climate change, at least in regard to new
mobile sources, and therefore federal common law public nuisance
actions are likely displaced as to those sources because final regulations have been put into place.
B. Displacement as to Fuel Sources
A gasoline producer seeking to dismiss a federal public-nuisance
claim against it for its contribution to global warming on displacement grounds presents a tougher question for the courts. Under the
227
CAA, the EPA has the authority to regulate any fuel or fuel additive.
Similar to regulation of mobile sources, the CAA prohibits certain activities and prescribes civil penalties and injunctive relief for violations of regulations promulgated for fuel and fuel additives under the
228
Act. Moreover, the content, and thus the resulting emissions, from
229
burning that fuel or fuel additive are directly regulated. Thus, if a
regulation is promulgated under § 211, the statute would likely
“speak directly” to questions presented in federal public-nuisance
claims against fuel companies for their contributions to global warming. Again, this would draw on an analogy between point source regulation under the FWPCA at the time of Milwaukee II and comprehensive fuel regulation under the CAA. Importantly, however, the
Administrator has not currently proposed regulations under this section of the Act.
Not all courts have recognized the difference between mobile
source and fuel regulation under the CAA, but this distinction is an
important one. The Second Circuit in AEP, for example, seemed to
ignore the distinction between fuel and mobile source regulation
when discussing the likely future displacement scheme under the
proposed endangerment and cause or contribute finding and instead
focused only on the distinction between stationary and mobile
230
sources. Why the Second Circuit ignored this distinction is unclear,
227

42 U.S.C. § 7545(a) (2006).
See § 7545(c)–(d).
229
See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,396–25,543 (May
7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536–38).
230
See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 376 n.45 (2d Cir. 2009)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2006); § 7545) (stating that mobile sources are regulated
through both tailpipe emissions standards and regulation of fuel content), cert.
granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174).
228
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but perhaps it was because the defendants in AEP were clearly stationary sources within the meaning of the CAA and the distinction was
therefore not relevant to the case. Regardless, what is clear is that
this distinction could have a significant legal impact on cases such as
one recently decided in the Northern District of California, Native Vil231
lage of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.
In Native Village of Kivalina, the Plaintiffs, a Native American Inupiat tribe and an Alaskan city, sought damages in federal public
nuisance tort against a number of private fuel companies who they
232
claim have contributed to global warming.
Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that the “[i]mpacts of global warming have damaged Kivalina to such a grave degree that Kivalina is becoming uninhabitable
233
and must now relocate its entire community.” Because the Administrator has not sought to regulate fuel and fuel additives directly in
the context of GHG emissions, at first blush the CAA would appear
not to displace claims against fuel companies. An argument can be
made by fuel companies, however, that the final endangerment and
cause or contribute finding and subsequent regulation does in fact
displace federal common law.
This argument would be based on the fact that fuel must be
burned, such as in a vehicle engine, in order to emit GHGs into the
air. Because of this, fuel companies could argue that regulation of
tailpipe emissions “speaks directly” to their contribution to global
warming as well. In other words, regulating the manner in which fuel
is burned regulates the way in which it contributes to global climate
change. So although the content of fuel is not itself regulated, the
manner in which it is burned—and thus, the manner in which it contributes to GHG emissions—is. If a fuel company can frame the debate in this manner, it may be able to prevail in arguing that regulation of tailpipe emissions “speaks directly” to its contribution to
global warming. A stronger argument, however, can be made for the
other side of the issue.

231

No. 08-1138, 2009 WL 3326113 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2009).
Id. at *1.
233
Complaint for Damages at ¶ 7, Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,
No. 08-1138 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 26, 2008). This case was recently dismissed on
standing and political question grounds, even though the opinion was handed down
subsequent to the Second Circuit’s decision in AEP. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 883 (N.D. Cal. 2009). Thus this case seems
destined for appeal to the Ninth Circuit, which never had the opportunity to address
the political question issue in California v. GMC because the appeal in that case was
voluntarily dismissed. Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Appeal, California v. GMC, No.
07-16908 (9th Cir. filed June 19, 2009).
232
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A plaintiff is likely to prevail on the displacement issue regardless of how the argument is framed. “To speak ‘directly to the question’ and displace federal common law, a federal statute must provide
some recourse for the problem at issue in the federal common law
234
claim.” Regulation of mobile sources under the CAA does not provide a means of recourse against fuel sources’ contribution to global
climate change. Instead, regulation of mobile sources only provides
recourse against those mobile sources and does not speak to damages
235
that can be linked to the fuel or fuel content.
Several Supreme
Court cases are on point in this matter. For example, the Supreme
Court, in County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, held that a federal
common-law claim for unlawful possession of native lands was not
displaced because the Nonintercourse Act did “not speak directly to
236
the question of remedies.”
Likewise, in United States v. Texas, the
Supreme Court held that the federal common law right to collect
prejudgment interest on debts owed to it by the states was not displaced by the Debt Collection Act of 1982 because the Act only provided for recourse against “people,” which under the express lan237
guage of the Act did not include states.
The CAA, with the final
endangerment and cause or contribute finding and emission standards officially adopted, only provides a remedy as against new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines and not against fuel companies. Therefore, the CAA would not have a displacement effect as to
these fuel companies. Further regulation of fuel content would be
needed pursuant to § 211 in order to displace the federal common
law as to producers of fuel.
C. Displacement as to Stationary Sources
Under the regulations currently being considered or officially
adopted by the EPA, stationary sources will be regulated but not to
238
the full extent possible pursuant to the statutory text. Because no
GHG endangerment finding is being made under § 108 of the CAA,
the EPA is not required to establish NAAQSs for GHG emissions by
239
stationary sources.
In turn, this means that states will not have to

234

Ken Alex, A Period of Consequences: Global Warming as Public Nuisance, 26 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 77, 88 (2007).
235
See 42 U.S.C. § 7524 (2006).
236
Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 237 (1985).
237
United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534–35 (1993).
238
See supra Part II.C.1.
239
See supra Part II.C.1.
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240

regulate stationary sources through adoption of a SIP.
Although
stationary sources will not be regulated in this manner, they do not
avoid regulation entirely because they will come under the ambit of
the pre-construction and operating permit requirements of PSD and
241
Title V. These permitting programs, however, will only be applicable to large stationary sources in accordance with the “tailoring”
242
rule.
Initially, worthy of mention is the fact that if the EPA were to
make an endangerment finding and establish NAAQSs in accordance
with Title I of the CAA, such regulatory actions would likely displace
243
the federal common law for stationary sources. Both SIPs and FIPs
provide broad discretion to the requisite authority to regulate statio244
nary sources, and both directly concern pollution levels. Additionally, once a NAAQS is established, the EPA is required to propose
New Source Performance Standards (NSPSs), which regulate the
245
emission levels for new major stationary sources.
The CAA also
provides a means of redress in the form of injunctive relief, criminal
246
penalties, and civil penalties for violation of NSPSs and SIPs. Under
this statutory scheme and accompanying regulation, if enacted, GHG
regulation would be directly spoken to, and therefore the federal
common law would be displaced. This, however, is not being considered under any of the final or proposed rulemakings. The regulatory scheme involving the promulgation of NAAQSs and the adoption
of SIPs is different from the permitting programs of PSD and Title V
in several ways. Most importantly, NAAQSs and SIPs regulate the to247
tal emissions released into the ambient air, while PSD regulates
emissions only through mandating the technology used by the statio248
nary source.
Title V adds no new substantive component but in240

See supra Part II.C.1.
See supra Part II.C.1.
242
See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52,
70, 71).
243
The question may arise at which stage in the process will displacement occur;
would displacement occur immediately upon promulgation of NAAQSs or only once
a SIP (or FIP) is put into place? This question, however, is largely academic and
would be of little concern to a litigant. Therefore, this question will not be fully addressed.
244
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A) (2006) (providing states with the ability to
dictate control measures, means, techniques, and time tables).
245
Id. § 7411(f).
246
Id. § 7413(b)–(d).
247
See id. § 7409.
248
See id. § 7475(a)(4).
241
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stead is merely the enforcement mechanism used to ensure stationary
249
sources are performing in accordance with the Act. Therefore, the
question becomes whether regulation of stationary sources through
the PSD and Title V permitting programs “speaks directly” to the
damage caused by emission of GHGs from stationary sources.
In Milwaukee II, the Supreme Court found especially important
the fact that “[e]very point source discharge is prohibited [by the
250
FWPCA] unless covered by a permit.”
Regulation of stationary
sources under SIPs would clearly meet this standard and take a comprehensive approach by covering all stationary sources. As one commentator has noted, “A significant indication that Congress has displaced federal common law through comprehensive legislation is the
251
presence of an all-encompassing permitting scheme.”
In contrast,
the permitting programs under PSD and Title V arguably are not sufficiently comprehensive, because they cover only large stationary
sources in accordance with the “tailoring” rule and do not cover every
stationary source. Whether the permitting scheme is sufficiently
comprehensive, however, is not dispositive.
Another concept underpinning the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in Milwaukee II was that courts should not be allowed to impose additional burdens on those falling under the jurisdiction of a federal
252
act. In the Court’s words, “[T]here is no basis for a federal court to
impose more stringent limitations than those imposed under the
253
regulatory regime by reference to the federal common law . . . .”
This possibly weighs in favor of displacement of the federal common
law of public nuisance by regulation pursuant to the permitting programs of PSD and Title V for stationary sources. One could argue
that Congress and the EPA have established that only large stationary
sources should be subject to these permitting schemes pursuant to
the “tailoring” rule and that the BACT is the standard adopted by
Congress for the PSD program. Therefore, courts should not be able
to impose further regulation beyond requiring the adoption of the
BACT for large stationary sources found in attainment areas. In other words, referencing the federal common law to allow small sources
(i.e., below the threshold established in the “tailoring” rule) to be
249
See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,298 (proposed Oct. 27, 2009) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71).
250
Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 318 (1981).
251
Alex, supra note 234, at 88.
252
Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 320.
253
Id.
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sued or to hold the BACT insufficient would amount to impermissible judicial legislation.
Using BACT as the standard for GHG emissions in this context,
however, poses a problem. A source’s BACT is determined on a case254
by-case basis.
Inherent in this determination then is a certain
amount of variation in allowable emissions. It follows, therefore, that
the judiciary cannot impose more stringent limitations than the CAA
itself imposes because there is no statutorily mandated emission limitation in the first place. There is no bright-line emission standard inherent in the definition of BACT, and therefore, it is not sufficiently
precise to prevent the judiciary from making reference to the federal
common law. Thus, the federal common law would still be needed as
a gap-filling measure to address the ultimate issue of GHG emissions
(i.e., the total amount of emissions); adoption of a specific technology would not “speak directly” to this issue.
Another question to be addressed is what is reasonable in the
context of GHG emissions. Like other actions in tort, one of the
main questions at issue in a public-nuisance action seeking redress
for the effects of global warming—assuming duty, causation, and
damages have been established—is the reasonableness of GHG emissions and the remedies that are appropriate if emission levels are
255
deemed unreasonable.
The CAA prescribes several remedies for
256
Therefore,
violation of PSD and Title V permitting requirements.
the displacement question then becomes whether Congress or the
EPA has spoken directly to the issue of reasonableness.
The first possible source for such a proposition could be the
EPA’s proposed “tailoring” rule. Does the level at which the PSD and
Title V permitting programs become applicable to GHG emissions
according to the “tailoring” rule constitute a determination by the
EPA that emissions below that threshold are reasonable? The EPA’s
reasoning behind the adoption of the “tailoring” rule is enlightening.
The EPA indicates that the main reason why it proposed the “tailoring” rule was because it would be administratively infeasible to require permits for all stationary sources emitting 100 or 250 tpy (de254

See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(12) (2010).
See supra Part II.A; Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 315 (noting that the federal statute
at issue in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978), spoke to “the question
of damages”).
256
42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(c)(1) (providing criminal penalties for “any person who
knowingly violates” 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(a) (2006), among other provisions),
7413(d)(1)(B) (providing for civil penalties for violation of any permit requirement), 7477 (providing for injunctive relief for violation of PSD permit), 7661(i)
(providing for sanctions for failure to meet Title V permitting requirements) (2006).
255

GRIMM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

4/12/2011 9:16 AM

COMMENT

711

257

pending on the source) of GHGs.
Notably, the EPA is silent as to
whether emissions above 25,000 tpy of GHGs (the minimum annual
level of emissions in the “tailoring” rule that would trigger the rule’s
application) are unreasonable. In fact, the EPA is likely without statutory authority to make such a determination under the proposed
“tailoring” rule. The Administrator, when proposing the “tailoring”
rule, relied on the legal doctrines of “absurd results” and “administra258
tive necessity.” These judicial doctrines are predicated on a lack of
statutory authority. These doctrines are applied when the administrative action goes against the plain meaning of the statutory text.
Thus, in the case of the “tailoring” rule the EPA did not rely on the
statutory text itself.
Regardless of whether the EPA has the authority to prescribe the
reasonableness of PSD and Title V application, it has not done so. To
assume that merely applying BACT to these sources—while refraining
from making an endangerment finding and proposing NAAQSs—is
equivalent to the EPA insinuating that such emissions are unreasonable is a stretch. The PSD and Title V permitting programs require
only the adoption of certain control technology. Unlike under § 202,
the EPA is not required to promulgate emission standards under either the PSD or Title V permitting programs. To be sure, the PSD
permitting program does establish a maximum level of emissions, but
this is only in regard to administratively established standards, such as
259
NAAQSs and SIPs. Again, EPA is not attempting to regulate statio260
nary sources through the adoption of NAAQSs under the CAA.
Thus, the applicability levels established by the proposed “tailoring”
rule clearly cannot constitute a determination of what is reasonable
and therefore do not speak directly to the question at issue.
Congress also has not spoken to the question of reasonableness
in the context of GHG emissions. As an initial matter, whether Congress intended the CAA to apply to GHGs in the first place is not at
261
all clear.
Even assuming that it did, however, it cannot be further
257
See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,516, 31,533 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts.
51, 52, 70, 71).
258
See id. at 55,303.
259
See 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(1), (3).
260
See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886, 18,888 (proposed
Apr. 24, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).
261
See Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act Before S. Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 110th Cong. 1–2 (2008) (statement of Marlo Lewis, Senior Fellow, Competitive Enterprises Institute). But cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,
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assumed that the 100 or 250 tpy applicability levels found in the statutory text in regard to PSD and Title V regulation stands for the proposition that emissions above that level are unreasonable for GHGs.
There is simply a lack of congressional intent in this regard. Further,
it would seem illogical for Congress to apply only BACT to an emission level that it considers unreasonable, as opposed to lowest achiev262
able emissions rate (LAER) —a stricter requirement—as Congress
mandated in the preconstruction nonattainment NSR permitting
263
program.
This dichotomy in the technology mandated under the
Act indicates the inherent nature of NAAQSs and further underscores the notion that Congress intended these levels (i.e., NAAQSs)
to be synonymous with a determination of reasonableness. In other
words, a NAAQS established by the EPA serves as the level above
which emissions giving rise to that level of pollution become unreasonable. This indicates that Congress essentially left the ultimate
question of what pollution levels are unreasonable to the expert
judgment of the EPA.
Additionally, this gives further credence to the assertion stated
above that the “tailoring” rule cannot constitute a determination of
reasonableness by the EPA. Because Congress gave authority to the
EPA to determine reasonableness of pollution concentration levels
through the promulgation of NAAQSs, it seems illogical that an administrative rulemaking concerning the PSD permitting program
could also serve as a statement of what is reasonable. If the PSD permitting program applies and its requirements are met, a presumption
that these emission levels are reasonable applies. This is because the
PSD program prohibits new stationary sources from emitting pollutants that result in pollution levels resulting in non-attainment or
264
above levels proscribed in a SIP.
Therefore, any change in this
program cannot constitute a reasonableness determination because

528–29 (2007) (holding that Congress intended the CAA to cover all airborne compounds based on the repeated use of the word “any” in the statutory text).
262
42 U.S.C. § 7501(3) (2006)
The term ‘lowest achievable emission rate’ means for any source, that
rate of emissions which reflects (A) the most stringent emission limitation which is contained in the implementation plan or any State for
such class or category of source, unless the owner or operator of the
proposed source demonstrates that such limitations are not achievable,
or (B) the most stringent emission limitation which is achieved in practice by such class or category of source, whichever is more stringent.
Id.
263
Id. § 7503(a)(2).
264
See id. § 7475(a).
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the fact that the program applies (assuming it is properly complied
with) results in a presumption of reasonableness.
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, Congress did not
speak directly to the ultimate question at issue in global-warming-aspublic-nuisance suits because regulations under PSD and Title V deal
265
only in terms of technology. Use of particular technology touches
on emissions levels, but does not prescribe them. No emissions standards are ever set. Therefore, a situation could develop in which
Source A emits many times more GHGs than Source B, but both are
employing the BACT available to them. Under this situation, the
question of global climate change—and thus, total GHG emissions—
is never directly spoken to. Rather, in this situation both Source A
and Source B are meeting their statutory requirements under the
permitting program, but Source A is presumably acting more unreasonably because it is contributing more to an increase in global warming due to its much higher emission levels.
Therefore, the PSD and Title V programs—by themselves and
without a requisite endangerment finding pursuant to § 108 and
promulgation of NAAQSs—are simply another set of regulations
touching air pollution and not a comprehensive scheme that displaces the federal common law as to stationary sources. This leads to the
conclusion that federal public nuisance actions against stationary
sources for their contributions to global warming are not displaced
under the currently proposed and finalized regulations.
D. A Lack of Judicial Guidance for Determining Redress for Past
Damages and a Common Sense Approach
Another key distinction to address in a displacement analysis is
the distinction between equitable and legal remedies. Equitable relief, in general, is meant to abate an ongoing injury—in this case an
266
ongoing nuisance.
As such, assuming that an endangerment and
cause or contribute finding for GHGs, the “light-duty vehicle” rule,
and the “tailoring” rule are in place at the time of initiation of a public nuisance suit for global warming, injunctive remedies sought under public nuisance claims for ongoing harms would be displaced insofar as the source is subject to those regulations (e.g., displaced for
265
See § 7475(a)(4); see also Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V
Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,298 (proposed Oct. 27,
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71) (noting that the Title V permitting program adds no new substantive regulatory component).
266
See, e.g., City of Montgomery v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 726 n.1 (1999)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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mobile sources if tailpipe emission standards are established). Where
this analysis becomes muddled, however, is when plaintiffs are seeking legal relief.
One purpose of damages in tort is “to give compensation, in267
demnity or restitution for harms.”
To achieve this redress, “[o]ne
injured by the tort of another is entitled to recover damages from the
other for all harm, past, present, and perspective, legally caused by
268
the tort.” Furthermore, “the law of torts attempts primarily to put
an injured person in a position as nearly as possible equivalent to his
269
position prior to the tort.”
The CAA provides the means to adequately deal with damages in all three contexts (stationary, mobile,
270
and fuel sources) on a forward-going basis. As noted above, the
CAA provides the Administrator the power to file civil actions against
271
those who violate regulations promulgated under the Act.
Thus,
Congress provides the means for remedial action under the CAA that
was missing in the Nonintercourse Act during the time in question in
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation where the Court held that the
272
statute did not speak directly to the question of damages. But the
CAA, even with the requisite administrative regulation of stationary,
mobile, and fuel sources, is silent as to remedies for past GHG emissions.
Little guidance is available from courts in the context of damages for pre-regulation torts committed when a statute currently displaces the federal common law. In fact, the district court in California
v. GMC seemed cognizant of this lack of judicial direction. In discussing whether global-warming-as-public-nuisance cases present “a lack
273
of judicially discoverable or manageable standards” by which to resolve the plaintiff’s claim, the court noted that the present suit for
damages was legally distinguishable from prior cases presenting a pol274
lution-as-public-nuisance claim.
The court stated that “[l]egally,
these cases are distinguishable because the remedies sought therein
were equitable remedies to enjoin or abate the nuisance, rather than

267

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(a) (1979).
Id. § 910 (emphasis added).
269
Id. § 901 cmt. a.
270
See supra Part IV.A–C.
271
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §7524(b) (2006).
272
Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 237 (1985).
273
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
274
California v. GMC, No. 06-05755, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, *46 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 27, 2007).
268
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the legal remedy of monetary damages sought in the current case.”
By stating this, the court was implying that the question of displacement for the pre-regulation damages caused by inter-state pollution
has never been adequately addressed by the federal judiciary.
This lack of judicial guidance is further complicated by the fact
that the CAA only considers future activities in its statutory text. For
example, in the context of mobile source regulation under the CAA,
the EPA administrator has the authority to regulate only “new motor
276
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines.” Further, the CAA is devoid
of remedies for the emission of pollution that occurs prior to the
enactment of regulations under §§ 108 (stationary sources), 202
(mobile sources), or 211 (fuels). This is because those emissions that
cause the alleged damage were not considered “criteria” pollutants
under the CAA at the time of their release and are thus not subject to
the Act’s jurisdiction. Therefore, harms caused by their release
would go un-redressed were this statutory scheme to displace claims
seeking damages for past torts. Therefore, the CAA—even if the requisite regulations were adopted under §§ 108, 202, or 211—likely
would not displace global-warming-as-public-nuisance actions for preregulation damages (i.e., prior to a rulemaking under the requisite
section) because the statute does not speak directly to past emissions
of “criteria” pollutants.
Again, as the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Texas,
“[M]ere refusal to legislate . . . falls far short of an expression of legis277
lative intent to supplant the existing common law in that area.” No
language in the CAA indicates congressional intent to supplant the
remedies available to litigants for the pre-regulation torts committed
by emitters of GHGs; the Act is silent on the question of past damages. Furthermore, civil penalties could not be issued for past emissions
because, as noted earlier, these emissions would not be under the jurisdiction of the statute. Therefore, the presumption favoring the
278
continued existence of federal common law is not overcome. As a
result, language indicating that pre-regulation emission of “criteria”
pollutants (in this case, GHGs) is not to be considered unreasonable—and thus such pollutants retroactively fall under the jurisdiction
of the CAA—would need to be added to the statutory or regulatory
275

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
277
United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 535 (1993) (citing Brief for the Petitioners at 16, United States v. Texas, No. 91-1729 (Nov. 19, 1992)).
278
See id. at 534; Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108
(1991) (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)).
276
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language in order to avoid a displacement scheme where preregulation damages are still recoverable under the federal common
279
law.
By including language such as this, the statutory text would
undercut any such argument against displacement by showing legislative intent to displace the federal common law. Language to this effect, however, is currently not in the CAA, the final endangerment
and cause or contribute finding, or any of the proposed or finalized
regulations. Thus, nothing in the current statutory or regulatory text
would displace future federal public-nuisance claims seeking redress
for the contribution to global warming from the pre-regulation emissions of GHGs by stationary and mobile sources or fuel producers.
V. PLOTTING THE COURSE AHEAD
Whether the regulatory regime currently proposed will be put
into effect is not at all certain. Despite the significant opportunity for
input, some individuals and industry groups opposed to regulation of
GHGs will attempt to use the courts to stop these rulemakings. The
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, for example, had threatened to bring
legal action to prevent the official adoption of the proposed endan280
germent and cause or contribute finding.
In fact, before the required deadline for filing such suits, at least sixteen parties have filed
suit against the EPA in order to prevent the endangerment and cause
281
or contribute finding from taking effect. But following the recent
decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in AEP, a change of
heart is likely amongst industry groups. Industry groups would much
more likely prefer to face a consistent regulatory scheme rather than
a series of suits in district courts over public nuisance claims. In fact,
prior to the Second Circuit’s decision, several industry groups—
including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce—were pressing for a full
evidentiary hearing on the proposed endangerment finding, likely
282
designed to delay regulation as long as possible. After the Second
279
As the Supreme Court noted in New Jersey v. New York, federal common law is
“subject to the paramount authority of Congress.” New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S.
336, 348 (1931). Furthermore, the Restatement (Second) of Torts is enlightening in its
provision stating that “court[s] may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable
man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1979).
280
Jim Tankersley, Vehicle Emissions Are Targeted; A Suit Seeks to Block the EPA Waiver
that Allowed the State to Set Its Own Standards, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2009, at B1 (“The
Chamber of Commerce also has threatened to sue to stop a proposed climate-related
ruling by the EPA: the ‘endangerment finding.’”).
281
Bravender, supra note 158.
282
See Petition of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America for
EPA to Conduct Its Endangerment Finding Proceeding On The Record Using Ad-
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Circuit’s decisions, however, several industry titans renounced their
membership in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce because of its posi283
tion on global-climate-change legislation. Furthermore, under the
proposed Waxman-Markey Bill, the EPA would be stripped of its authority to find carbon dioxide an air pollutant under the CAA, although this would be in exchange for comprehensive climate-change
284
285
legislation. Such legislation, however, seems a long way off.
What is clear after the recent decisions by the Second Circuit in
AEP and the Fifth Circuit in Comer is that there is a heated debate and
much uncertainty over how to address the issue of global climate
change. The question now presented is how best to move forward in
light of these circuit court decisions. A consistent, comprehensive
scheme seems like the best option. Industry groups are now seemingly open to a vast amount of liability for their pre-regulation contributions to global climate change, at least in the Second and Fifth Circuits. The Second Circuit made the prospect of liability even more
perilous to industry groups by upholding standing not only for states
suing as parens partriae, but also by upholding Article III standing for
286
the City of New York and private land trusts.
Therefore, a large
number of prospective plaintiffs now exist to enforce their common
law right to be free from unreasonable GHG emissions leading to
global climate change. It is unlikely that industry groups would prefer to be subject to the sometimes varying and contradictory decisions
of the judicial process. At least one commentator, for example, has
compared these early global-warming-as-public-nuisance suits with the
early litigation against asbestos and tobacco companies, which have
287
cost those companies millions. Thus, even though industry groups
have resisted regulation in the past, they would most likely prefer to
be subject to a consistent—although light—comprehensive legislative
scheme in the future.

ministrative Procedure Act §§ 556 and 557, EPA Docket ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0171
(June 23, 2009), available at http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/
comments/090623_epa_petition.pdf.
283
Clifford Krauss & Kate Galbraith, Climate Bill Splits Exelon and Chamber of Commerce, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at B1.
284
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§
811, 831–835 (2009).
285
See, e.g., Galbraith, supra note 29.
286
See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 332–49 (2d Cir. 2009),
cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174).
287
See John Schwartz, Courts as Battlefields in Climate Fights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,
2010, at A1.
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One possible solution would be to avoid regulation under the
CAA altogether and let courts handle this matter strictly as a public
288
nuisance, as discussed earlier. The problem with this suggestion is
that emitters of GHGs currently do not, and would not for a substantial period of time, have any indication of what is reasonable in the
context of GHG emissions. Additionally, courts can often come to
conflicting decisions, which would leave industry groups uncertain as
to what measures are appropriate to avoid liability. Other questions
are left to be addressed as well. For example, is the reasonableness of
the amount of GHG emissions variable depending on what purpose
those emissions achieve? Is it reasonable to allow companies producing electricity, and therefore furthering our energy independence, to
emit more GHGs into the air than other industries that are less important to our national security? Or is reasonableness a per se measurement? These and other similar questions demonstrate that judicial regulation of GHG emissions proves to be an unworkable scheme
in the short term because of its inherent uncertainty and a more
comprehensive legislative system is needed to address all concerns
raised in this complex area.
The question also must be asked whether the CAA is the proper
place to provide this regulation or whether separate legislation is necessary to address the problem of GHG emissions. As explained
above, the CAA supplies at least a partially viable tool for displacing
the federal common law of public nuisance, alleviating the fear of in289
dustry groups likely to result from the AEP and Comer decisions.
This may serve as a temporary stop-gap measure while future comprehensive legislation is considered. The problems posed by the absence of language addressing pre-regulation emissions, however,
make the CAA an incomplete tool for total regulation—and thus, total displacement. This concern can only be addressed by new statutory language indicating congressional intent to displace pre-regulation
damages by retroactively making past emissions fall within the statute’s jurisdiction. This is clearly an incredibly complex area and a
comprehensive scheme seems to be the only plausible route to fully
meeting the challenges posed by GHG emissions. Because of this, a
290
new statutory scheme, similar to that being proposed in Congress,
must be adopted and put into place. Without a comprehensive
scheme to displace the federal common law completely, inconsistent
judgments and regulatory uncertainty on behalf of industry groups
288
289
290

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part IV.
H.R. 2454.
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will continue even after administrative action by the EPA to address
global climate change under the CAA.
VI. CONCLUSION
Sparked by seeming inaction in Washington to fully address the
concerns about global climate change, plaintiffs over the last few
years have taken matters into their own hands by filing federal common law nuisance claims against emitters of GHGs. Initially, such efforts were met with resistance in district courts, where several cases
were dismissed on political question grounds. Until recently no appellate court had addressed the issue. Although this is not a settled
question, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was the first appellate
court to address whether global-warming-as-public-nuisance claims
present nonjusticiable political questions. The Second Circuit held
that such claims are in fact justiciable. A panel decision in the Fifth
Circuit has since followed suit. The Second Circuit in AEP further
held that under the present configuration of the CAA, the Act did
not displace federal common law for the public nuisance of global
climate change. But the court was clear that the CAA could provide a
vehicle for common law displacement pursuant to the EPA’s rulemaking power. The Supreme Court has since granted a writ of certiorari to potentially address several of the complicated issues presented by the litigants in AEP.
Currently, the EPA has adopted a final endangerment and cause
or contribute finding under § 202 of the CAA, which regulates mobile sources. Further, the EPA has finalized the adoption of tailpipe
emissions standards for “light-duty vehicles” in accordance with this
finding. The EPA has also finalized a “tailoring” rule aimed at regulating large stationary sources. But, no regulation has been proposed
under § 211 to regulate fuel content. An analysis of the CAA, with
the final endangerment and cause or contribute finding under § 202,
the “light-duty vehicle” rule, and the proposed “tailoring” rule all officially adopted, reveals that a unique displacement scheme would
emerge.
Federal public-nuisance claims against fuel producers would not
be displaced because no regulatory or statutory language would speak
directly to those sources. Though an argument could be made that
the contribution of fuel producers to global climate change has been
displaced because the burning of fuel in mobile sources would be
subject to emission standards, those arguments are likely to fail because the statutory language provides no means of redress without a
requisite rulemaking under § 211. In contrast, public nuisance ac-
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tions against mobile sources, such as car manufacturers, for their
contribution to global warming would almost certainly be displaced
because the EPA is seeking to regulate tailpipe emissions and the
CAA provides a means of redress for violations of these regulations.
Displacement as to stationary sources provides a tougher question.
If an endangerment finding is made pursuant to § 108 and
NAAQs are developed, the common law would likely be displaced
with respect to stationary sources. This is because NAAQSs would directly regulate GHG emissions and provide a means of redress for violation of these standards. Furthermore, many more sources are addressed through SIPs because of the lower statutory threshold—as
opposed to the regulation of only large stationary sources resulting
from the “tailoring” rule—and pollution levels are dealt with directly.
The EPA, however, has not proposed to do this. Rather, stationary
sources—specifically large stationary sources—are going to be regulated pursuant to the permitting programs of PSD and Title V in accordance with the proposed “tailoring” rule. These permitting programs will regulate only the technology, as determined on a case-bycase basis, that is used by large stationary sources and do not directly
regulate GHG emissions or establish the level above which GHG
emissions are unreasonable. In addition, only some stationary
sources will fall under the ambit of these permitting schemes, and
therefore—absent a legislative or regulatory determination that they
are not harmful—whether these permitting schemes are sufficiently
comprehensive is questionable. Thus, regardless of the fact that
these permitting programs provide means of redress for violations of
these standards, no displacement is likely to occur. Regulating only
some sources and only the technology used on a case-by-case basis,
while not regulating the overall emissions, does not speak directly to
the question at issue (i.e., total GHG-emission levels) and therefore
does not displace the common law.
The CAA, even with the proposed and final regulations in place,
does not provide redress for pre-regulation emissions. In fact, the
reasonableness of pre-regulation emissions is not mentioned anywhere in the CAA or in any of the final or proposed regulations. Little judicial guidance is available in this area, but the CAA does not
seem to speak directly to the issue of pre-regulation torts. As a result,
federal public nuisance law would remain available to plaintiffs seeking damages for pre-regulation GHG emissions, as in the case of Native Village of Kivalina. Pre-regulation emissions must be addressed legislatively in order to displace the federal common law in this area.
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Industry groups will likely not be happy about the prospect of
facing de facto regulation through the judicial process, which is the
apparent reality that some industry groups now face after the decisions in AEP and Comer. Without thorough judicial precedent to
guide them, much uncertainty remains for groups that will be subject
to this de facto regulation. Many of the fears espoused in earlier district court cases relying on the political question doctrine reemerge
in this context. For example, questions about what role national security should play in a determination of reasonableness are left unanswered. Such questions leave industry groups without reliable guideposts by which to regulate their GHG emissions or take other
necessary steps in order to limit their possible liability. The prospect
of de facto regulation seems even more perilous for large stationary
sources under the emerging regulatory scheme. Assuming that these
proposed regulations are all officially adopted, large stationary
sources will not only be facing vast amounts of possible liability, but
they also face increased regulatory costs pursuant to PSD and Title V.
This makes partial regulation under the CAA seem incomplete and,
in some sense, unfair. Still, these recent circuit decisions and final
and proposed rulemakings by the EPA are a vital first step in fighting
the battle against global climate change. Hopefully, the Second and
Fifth Circuits have supplied the motivation for those in Washington
to act and finally create a comprehensive approach to what is arguably the greatest challenge facing civilization in the coming decades.

